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Abstract—While deep machine learning technologies are now
pervasive in state-of-the-art image recognition and natural lan-
guage processing applications, only in recent years have these
technologies started to sufficiently mature in applications related
to wireless communications. In particular, recent research has
shown deep machine learning to be an enabling technology
for cognitive radio applications as well as a useful tool for
supplementing expertly defined algorithms for spectrum sensing
applications such as signal detection, estimation, and classifi-
cation (termed here as Radio Frequency Machine Learning,
or RFML). A major driver for the usage of deep machine
learning in the context of wireless communications is that little,
to no, a priori knowledge of the intended spectral environment
is required, given that there is an abundance of representative
data to facilitate training and evaluation. However, in addition
to this fundamental need for sufficient data, there are other key
considerations, such as trust, security, and hardware/software
issues, that must be taken into account before deploying deep
machine learning systems in real-world wireless communication
applications. This paper provides an overview and survey of
prior work related to these major research considerations. In
particular, we present their unique considerations in the RFML
application space, which are not generally present in the image,
audio, and/or text application spaces.
Index Terms—survey, deep learning, neural networks, radio
frequency machine learning, cognitive radio, cognitive radar,
spectrum sensing, dynamic spectrum access, automatic modula-
tion classification, specific emitter identification, signal detection
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning (DL) has become a transformative technology
for improving the capabilities of autonomous image recogni-
tion and Natural Language Processing (NLP), among many
others. As a result, in recent years, DL has been looked
to in the wireless communications domain for facilitating
applications such as blind spectrum sensing tasks, including
signal detection, estimation, classification, and specific emitter
identification, as well as an enabling technology for cognitive
radio tasks such as Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA). Given
initial successes in these areas, among others, DL is being con-
sidered as a major transformative technology in the upcoming
5G standard and is expected to be a core component of 6G
technologies and beyond [1].
Figure 1: The Radio Frequency Machine Learning (RFML)
“Ecosystem” is made up of the major research thrust areas
that must be considered holistically in order to utilize RFML
systems in real-world applications.
To date, research in applying DL to wireless communi-
cations applications, commonly termed RFML, has predomi-
nately focused on providing novel solutions that have relied
heavily on existing techniques used in other DL modalities
applied to the wireless communications application of interest.
While this is a logical first step and has shown success, it is
expected that the next great leap in RFML capabilities will
likely require uniquely tailoring deep learning architectures
and techniques to the Radio Frequency (RF) domain using
domain specific knowledge, just as Convolutional Neural Net-
works (CNNs) were first designed for the unique challenges
of the image processing domain.
This paper aims to facilitate this evolution by providing
an overview of the key RF domain specific considerations
that must be taken into account before deploying RFML
solutions in real-world wireless communication applications.
More specifically, this paper provides an overview and survey
of prior works related to important research areas such as RF
dataset formulation (Section III), as well as RFML security
(Section IV), trust (Section V), and deployment (Section VI).
Through this discussion, particular attention is paid to how
all of these areas, the aggregate of which is here termed the
RFML “Ecosystem” and illustrated in Figure 1, interact with
and affect one another as they are inextricably dependent and
therefore must be considered in tandem.
The application of DL to wireless communications ap-
plications is a very broad topic area with many different
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2definitions and assumptions. For the discussions and literature
review undertaken in this work, RFML is here defined as
the usage of DL techniques that aim to reduce the amount
of expert defined features and prior knowledge is needed for
the intended application. In other words, we predominately
consider works in which the input to the RFML system is the
raw RF data [2], with some discussion of prior works utilizing
or deriving pre-defined expert features.
The current body of literature surveying RFML is copious,
yet narrowly focused. More specifically, existing surveys are
typically algorithm and/or application focused, and overview,
compare, and contrast the learning techniques used and high-
light the variety of applications and operating conditions under
which RFML is beneficial [3]–[17].
A few more unique surveys have also examined RFML
dataset generation using GNU Radio [18], the use of big
data techniques in wireless networks [19], operational consid-
erations for using cognitive radio in a military setting [20],
security and privacy challenges faced in cognitive wireless
sensor networks [21], and solutions for combating practical
imperfections encountered in cognitive radio system (i.e. noise
uncertainty, channel/interference uncertainty, hardware imper-
fections, signal uncertainty, synchronization issues) [22].
In contrast, the scope of this paper is to holistically bring
together these disparate works, highlighting the interdependen-
cies, through the broader RFML “Ecosystem” that underpins
them.
II. APPLICATIONS
The RFML ecosystem, as the name implies, is the sup-
porting considerations in the development and deployment of
RFML applications. Therefore, before we discuss the different
facets of the RFML ecosystem, it is important to provide
context through a discussion of the relevant RFML applica-
tions found in the literature. An overview of the algorithms
described herein, including training data types and algorithm
input types, is given in Table I.
Machine Learning (ML), and DL in particular, has been
applied to a wide variety of areas within wireless communica-
tions, including networking applications, power management,
and radio control. Given the scope of this paper, as defined
above, the applications discussed here tend closer to the
physical layer, and can generally be described as spectrum
sensing applications.
A. Spectrum Sensing
Spectrum sensing is the process of gaining knowledge
of a given spectral environment with little, to no, a pri-
ori knowledge of the environment. Spectrum sensing is pri-
marily made up of the following Digital Signal Processing
(DSP) tasks: signal detection [23]–[41], [87]–[89], [118],
signal parameter estimation [13], [92]–[97], signal classifica-
tion [18], [42]–[81], [83]–[88], [97], [119], emitter identifica-
tion/fingerprinting [98]–[103], and anomaly detection [104],
[105]. These spectrum sensing tasks are of fundamental im-
portance in both military and commercial applications. For
example, in military communications, spectrum sensing is
critically important for jamming/anti-jamming, eavesdropping,
localization, and demodulation of adversary communications
[120]. In commercial communications, spectrum sensing is
the primary enabler of DSA in which spectrum users col-
laboratively utilize spectrum resources without the need for
strict, and typically inefficient, spectrum licenses or centralized
spectrum managers [106]–[112]. Finally, as the quantity of
wireless devices continue to grow and rest in the hands of
the general public, localization can be a significant tool for
a multitude of emergency and safety applications [90], [91],
such as search and rescue operations.
1) Automatic Modulation Classification (AMC): One of
the earliest, and perhaps the most researched, applications of
RFML for spectrum sensing is in the area of modulation clas-
sification, likely due to the fact machine learning techniques
have historically performed extremely well on classification
tasks. Traditional modulation classification techniques typi-
cally consist of two signal processing stages: feature extraction
and pattern recognition. Traditionally, the feature extraction
stage has relied on the use of so-called “expert features”
in which a human domain-expert pre-defines a set of signal
features that allow for statistical separation of the modulation
classes of interest, examples of which can be found in [121].
These expertly defined signal features are extracted from the
raw received signal during a potentially time intensive and
computationally expensive pre-processing stage. These expert
features are then used as input to a pattern recognition algo-
rithm, which might consist of decision trees, support vector
machines, feed-forward neural networks, among many others.
RFML based approaches have aimed to replace the human
intelligence and domain expertise required to identify and
characterize these features using deep neural networks and
advanced architectures, such as CNNs and Recurrent Neural
Networks (RNNs), to both blindly and automatically identify
separating features and classify signals of interest, with min-
imal pre-processing and less a priori knowledge [48], [52],
[56], [57], [82]. Given the significant research in RFML-based
modulation classification, it can be argued that AMC is one
of the most mature fields in RFML, and has been deployed in
real-world products [122].
2) Signal Detection: Another spectrum sensing area seeing
a particular increase in the RFML literature is signal detection
[25], [36], [89]. This is one key example in which image
processing techniques have been directly applied to solve
RFML problems. For example, in [25], [36], [89], the raw
In-Phase and Quadrature (IQ) samples were converted into
spectrum waterfall plots, where the spectrum information in
the time-frequency plane is viewed as an image. This has
allowed a rich class of image processing techniques to be
applied directly to signal detection applications for positive
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) environments.
3) Specific Emitter Identification: Specific Emitter Iden-
tification (SEI), also known as RF Fingerprinting, is an
application that has benefited greatly from the advent of
RFML [101]–[103], [123], [124]. For the purposes of SEI,
classification is aimed not towards the transmitted signal,
but the transmitter itself, which is possible due to slight
(but consistent) differences between emitters, such as IQ
3citation application dataset type input type
real synthetic augmented raw samples features
[23] detection X X
[24]–[31] X X
[32]–[40] X X
[41] X X X
[42]–[44] classification X X
[18], [45]–[57] X X
[58]–[63] X X
[64]–[81] X X
[82] X X X
[83] X X X
[84] X X X X
[85], [86] X X X
[87] detection &classification X X
[88] X X
[89]–[91] parameter estimation X X
[13], [92] X X
[93]–[96] X X
[97] parameter estimation &classification X X
[98]–[100] SEI X X
[101] X X
[102], [103] X X
[104] Anomaly Detection X X
[105] X X
[106]–[108] DSA X X
[109]–[112] Cognitive Radar X X
[113] Cognitive Radio X X
[114] X X X
[115], [116] X X
[117] X X X
Table I: An overview of the dataset and input types used in popular RFML applications.
imbalances, amplifier non-idealities, and other imperfections
caused during the manufacturing process [102], as well as
geographical differences such as propagation channels and
angle of arrival [125].
These differences not only exist between transmitter brands
and models, but amongst transmitters of the same brand and
model, which may have been manufactured side-by-side. Due
to the difficult nature of defining expert features to distinguish
between these subtle differences, the usage of DL within
SEI has shown great benefits. More specifically, given the
vast number of existing devices, each of which exhibit nearly
imperceptible differences, it is near impossible to accurately
predict, model, and extract discriminating features. Given
these limitations, DL-based solutions, more specifically CNNs,
which ingest raw RF data, have been used in order to learn
the discriminating features for identifying transmitters [101],
[102].
4) Parameter Estimation: Parameter estimation is the pro-
cess of determining relevant discriminating features of a trans-
mitted signal (center frequency, bandwidth, duration, etc) or
its propagation channel (time/frequency drifts, shadowing loss,
multi-path taps, etc). Often, parameter estimation in RFML is
a byproduct of other spectrum sensing tasks. For example, for
signal detection applications utilizing spectral waterfall images
as input, estimates of the bandwidth, center frequency, and
duration are found during the detection process. However,
applying RFML directly for parameter estimation has also
shown promise, especially in the area of localization.
Localization is incredibly important in both military and
commercial communications. Although, traditionally, localiza-
tion techniques have relied on expert defined features such as
received signal strength [126], in recent years a more rich set
4of RF measurements have been used [94], [126]. In recent
work, channel state information is used to reach cm-level
accuracy [91] and tackle the difficult problem of indoor 3D
(i.e. multi-floor) localization [93]. There has also been progress
towards classifying indoor locations using RF samples [95].
5) Anomaly Detection: Finally, an emerging RFML appli-
cation area is anomalous event detection. In these applications,
the intent is for a deep learning approach to learn the baseline
environment and detect/classify deviations from this baseline
(so-called anomalies). Such applications may also be used
to detect adversarial attacks or to identify out-of-distribution
examples, as discussed further in Sections IV and V.
An example of this budding area of research can be found
in [104], where RF spectrum activities are monitored and
analyzed using a deep predictive coding Neural Networks
(NNs) to identify anomalous wireless emissions within spec-
trograms. Similarly, in [105], the authors utilized recurrent
neural predictive models to identify anomalies in raw IQ data.
B. Cognitive Radio
In the literature, the terms RFML and cognitive radio have
often been mistakenly used interchangeably. In comparison to
the definition of RFML given in Section I, cognitive radio
is the use of software-defined radios coupled with state-of-
the-art RFML techniques to enable radios to intelligently, and
efficiently, utilize its hardware and spectral resources [117].
RFML-based solutions have further enabled the realization
of cognitive radio through two keys areas, namely through
improved spectrum sensing capabilities (as just discussed) and
through direct replacement of fixed signal processing stages
with RFML-enabled dynamic stages.
The primary goal of cognitive radio is to adapt to changing
channel conditions without needing a human in the loop or
time intensive re-configurations. While the usage of RFML-
based techniques for supplementing traditional DSP tech-
niques in cognitive radios is still in its infancy, these initial
works show promise. One intriguing example of cognitive
radio is the use of Generative Adversarial Network (GAN)
or Autoencoder (AE) for end-to-end communications systems
design. More specifically, in [13], [113]–[116], the authors
developed algorithms that allow the neural network model to
design the physical layer communications protocol (including
modulation scheme, coding scheme, filtering, etc.), using bit
or symbol error rate as the performance metric, to overcome
the challenge of choosing an appropriate modulation scheme
for an unknown, uncharacterized, or changing channel. These
approaches have shown promise for both single-input-single-
output (SISO) and multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) ra-
dio communications.
III. DATASET CREATION
In any application of DL, representative and well-labeled
datasets are of critical importance for training and/or evalua-
tion. Datasets can generally be categorized into one of three
types, namely simulated, captured/collected, and augmented.
Simulated datasets refer to synthetically generated data, in
which the transmitter, channel, and receiver are all modeled
in software/hardware. In contrast, captured datasets are col-
lected from signals that have been transmitted over a wireless
channel. Finally, augmented datasets combine simulated and
captured data by adding synthetic perturbations to captured
data and/or adding synthetic signals to captured channels.
Simulated datasets are the most commonly used in current
RFML literature as they are the most straightforward to com-
pile and label using publicly available toolsets such as GNU
Radio [127], liquid-dsp [128], and MATLAB [129] among
others, and therefore lends itself well to initial development
[18], [26], [28], [30], [33]–[42], [44]–[56], [58], [60], [65]–
[79], [83]–[88], [92], [100], [102], [118], [119], [130]–[135].
Unlike in image processing [136], the same equations and
processes used to transmit waveforms in real systems can
be used directly in simulation, due to their man-made nature
[18]. Additionally, for simplistic environments, mathematical
models can be used to reasonably describe common degra-
dations such as additive interference, channel effects, and
transceiver imperfections. As a result, synthetically generated
RFML datasets can be good analogs for captured RFML
datasets, if carefully crafted and known models exist.
Captured data is necessary for test and evaluation prior
to real-world deployment, but requires significant man-hours
and resources to properly collect [23]–[29], [36], [41], [43],
[44], [59]–[63], [80], [84], [88], [93]–[96], [98], [99], [101],
[137], [138]. This type of data is necessary, because a capture
from the real environment will include all of the different
degradation types that are of concern in practical RF situations,
some of which may be missing from a simulated dataset
due to inaccurate modeling; captured data often reduces end
user resistance and doubt surrounding the system. As just
mentioned, the downside to utilizing capture data are the man-
hours and resources required to gather sufficiently diverse
captures for producing a training and/or evaluation datasets,
and then to label it correctly [46]. This is the fundamental
reason that augmented datasets are used, which combine
simulated and captured data to increase the quantity of data
available for training, or to create more realistic datasets [41]–
[43], [84], [98], [119].
Finally, while not as optimal as real world data, augmented
datasets aim to provide a “best of both worlds” approach by
minimizing the limitations of synthetic datasets (i.e. real-world
model accuracy) and reducing the amount of captured data
needed. At its most basic, augmented datasets shuffle a small
subset of real-world data into a larger synthetic dataset. The
intent with this approach is to utilize the synthetic data to
teach the DL model the features and characteristics of signals
that can be well modeled in software (modulation schemes,
simple channel models, etc), while the captured data is used
to teach the DL model the features and characteristics of
signals that cannot be modeled well (i.e. transmitter/receiver
imperfections). A more complex augmented dataset might
include injecting synthetic waveforms into captured spectrum.
Such a dataset would be useful in testing detection and
classification performance of the signals in a congested or
interference environment with real-world transmitted signals.
As another example, synthetic noise could be added to real
world captures to decrease the SNR without performing addi-
5tional signal captures, and increasing the range of test SNRs.
However, there are a multitude of open research questions in
the development and usage of augmented datasets. While many
of these questions are application and environment specific,
perhaps the most important of these open questions is how
to balance the amount of real, synthetic, and augmented data
used in training datasets to avoid network bias.
A. Real World Considerations
No matter the type of dataset being created, there are
a number of real-world effects that need to be considered,
as they can dramatically impact RFML system performance.
When measuring the performance of an RFML device on
laboratory-measured or synthetic data versus observed data,
the primary difference is often that the trained environment
is pristine in comparison to a real environment. This is due
to the fact that signals that have propagated in the physical
world undergo degradation from multiple overlapping sources
not typically encountered in a laboratory. More specifically,
both the transmitter and receiver will cause some distortion
in the form of non-linearities, additive noise, timing offsets,
frequency offsets, phase offsets, sample rate mismatches,
and/or amplitude offsets, all potentially time varying, altering
the signal from the ideal. Additionally, the physical medium, or
channel, through which the signal propagates can change as the
transceivers travel around or the environment shifts, allowing
delayed imperfect reflections to overlap with the direct path
causing time and frequency varying interference with itself.
Depending on the application, the distortion to the wave-
form caused by the transmitter in particular may be a param-
eter of interest or may be considered a nuisance parameter
requiring an ensemble of emitters to model an average emitter.
For example, applications such as SEI depend upon transmitter
imperfections to distinguish between emitters. Meanwhile,
within AMC transmitter imperfections are considered nuisance
parameters, as the goal of AMC is to identify the modulation
class, regardless of the emitter. In the case of receiver distor-
tions [46], [126], we find that natural reception variations such
as sampling rate differentials, frequency offsets, and varying
SNR lead to the requirement for generalized training across
each of the parameters [139].
An important note for these hardware variations is that high
quality hardware tends to have fewer distortions. For example,
military transmitters are often harder to RF fingerprint than
low-cost Internet-of-Things (IoT) transmitters, and RF signal
behaviors learned through a high-quality receiver will translate
more easily to another high quality receiver rather than one
of lower quality. Moreover, the non-linearities that contribute
to these variations are often dependent upon technology and
hardware configurations, and lack of synchronization between
devices will exacerbate the distortion caused by both the
physical medium and the devices. In this case detection and
isolation routines are needed to select spectrum of interest,
which in turn will introduce measurement errors in time,
frequency, and phase offsets between the transceivers. These
measurement errors should also be modeled in order create a
realistic simulated dataset.
A second area of real-world consideration for RFML system
performance is the signal propagation and/or channel effects.
The baseline laboratory training environment for virtually all
RF systems is an Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN)
channel, yet real-world channels have time-varying, often
colored spectra, and uncontrolled RF interference sources such
as other signals, impulsive noise (i.e. lightning), and non-linear
effects associated with bursty packet transmissions. Relative
motion between platforms, co-channel/adjacent channel inter-
ference, and multi-path should also be considered, yet is often
ignored during laboratory training.
Finally, a third consideration, and we believe largely an open
problem as we look to scale up the deployment of RFML
solutions in real-world scenarios is the use of transfer learning
[140], [141], where the behaviors learned and observations
collected can be shared between sensors, as well as online
or incremental learning, where the behaviors learned are
modified over time as a function of a changing environment.
For example, automated vehicles could benefit greatly from
sharing their observations with the neighboring platforms
while operating in a Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V)/Vehicle-to-
Infrastructure (V2I) environment. However, abrupt differences
in urban environments and military signal collection/analysis
platforms (e.g., ship or Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV))
make this challenging. Any future works must consider that the
behaviors learned on one platform will be influenced by their
RF hardware, which is distinct and possibly vastly different
from a second platform. Moreover, the acceptance of online,
incremental, and transfer learning poses the significant risks
that any learned or transferred behaviors may misrepresent
the actual environment (unintentionally or through adversarial
interaction), suggesting the need for periodic save points for
all relevant parameters.
B. Developing a Dataset
Taking into account the three types of datasets (simulated,
captured, and augmented), and some of the concerns relevant
when operating an RFML system outside of a laboratory
setting, what follows are general guidelines that should be
observed when creating a new RFML dataset. The first step,
no matter the type of dataset being created or intended applica-
tion, is identifying the expected degradations in the deployed
environment (i.e. channel types, transmitter imperfections,
SNR, etc) and categorizing whether each potential degradation
is fundamental to the application. Minimally, each degradation
considered fundamental to the application should be described
by either
• defining (mathematically) how the degradation is applied,
in simulated and augmented datasets, or
• defining the conditions under which the degradation is
collected (i.e. hardware used, environment, etc), for cap-
tured datasets.
For each identified nuisance degradation, attempts should be
made to generalize over observations of the degradation, such
as sweeping over the impairment range in simulations or
changing the transmission devices or environment in some way
while capturing the dataset.
6During the dataset creation process, whether through simu-
lation or collection, correctly and completely labelling the data
is of the utmost importance. Ideally, though not practically,
every parameter should be recorded as metadata associated
with the observations in the dataset to increase the number of
applications pertinent to the dataset [142]. Qualitative descrip-
tions can also be used to provide as much description as is
feasible. Minimally, the parameter of interest to the application
(the modulation class in the case of AMC, for example) should
be recorded. However, the value of generating and providing
datasets with significant diversity, documentation, and open
usage rights should not be lost on the community as the gains
observed in the image processing domain were realized with
the help of crowd sourcing efforts and donations of people’s
time [143].
C. Data Used in Existing Works
A non-exhaustive search for publicly available datasets
within RFML turns up datasets released by Geotec [144]
for Emitter Localization, DeepSig [145] for AMC, and by
Genesys at Northeastern University [146] for RF Fingerprint-
ing. These published datasets were generated for and used
in original published works [18], [44], [96], [138], and have
created a common point of comparison for different ML
approaches within the literature. Though establishing whether
these specific datasets can be trusted is outside the scope of
the work, knowledge of how the signals in any RF dataset
were generated and understanding how to extend/modify said
dataset to suit one’s needs is critical in answering whether
that dataset can be trusted. Otherwise every signal (and the
associated metadata, if applicable) should go through some
form of validation by the user, prior to accepting that dataset,
but such a validation process is often prohibitive both in
computation and time.
Given the limited availability of publicly available RFML
datasets, the majority of existing works create their own. For
these works and future works, it is critical to describe the
parameter space from which the data was generated in the
final publication, so that future researchers can reproduce the
results. As an example, we consider the signal shown in Figure
2, where two signals have been generated with the same SNR
(but with vastly different sampling rates), as defined by
ΓdB = 10 log10
(∑
n∈N
|sn|2
)
− 10 log10
(∑
n∈N
|νn|2
)
(1)
where sn is the N samples of the signal of interest and νn is
the N samples of AWGN and ΓdB is the SNR value in dB.
Traditional DSP dictates that the bottom signal can achieve a
higher maximum SNR using a matched filter, as is evident in
the constellation plots. As most RFML applications describe
performance as a function SNR, not including parameters
such as sampling rates can greatly impede the ability to
reproduce results and can therefore lead to false comparisons
in subsequent publications.
Further exacerbating this issue, results could also be de-
scribed in reference to the energy per bit or Eb/N0, further
creating ambiguity. In this case, the effect of sample rate
Figure 2: An example of the difficulties of direct comparison
when the dataset’s parameters are not explicitly defined. In
this case, both signals can claim an SNR value of 0 dB,
but the second is significantly oversampled and allows for
either preprocessing or learning a filter-like behavior raising
the apparent SNR observed during processing.
scaling is already accounted for, but this definition suffers
when considering waveforms with no direct definition of
Eb/N0.
IV. SECURITY
While AI/ML has been adopted in some format in nearly
all industries in recent years, it’s limitations in adversarial
settings have been well documented in modalities such as
Computer Vision (CV) [147], audio recognition [148]–[150],
and NLP [151]. While the attacks demonstrated in other
modalities serve as a prescient warning for applications of
RFML and many parallels can be drawn, recent work has
shown there are unique considerations for AI security in the
context of RF due to the nature of wireless propagation, pre-
processing steps before RF signals of interest are input to
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), and the fact that wireless
communications are generally quite sensitive to perturbations
in the transmission. Therefore, while this section provides a
brief overview of AI security in general, the focus is on the
unique considerations in RFML for which a Threat Model is
provided in Figure 3 which quickly categorizes the related
work in the area.
A. Adversarial Machine Learning
When discussing AI security, the conversation primarily
revolves around Adversarial ML which concerns the devel-
opment of algorithms to attack data driven models and to
defend against such attacks. Discussions of Adversarial ML
[161], [162] date back at least 15 years [163]–[165] and have
broadened to include exploratory attacks that seek to learn
information about (or replicate) the classifier [166] or training
data [167] through limited probes on the model to observe it’s
input/output relationship. However, the most recent explosion
in concern for the vulnerabilities of DNNs specifically is
largely credited to the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
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Figure 3: Threat Model for RFML adopted from [156], [160]
and including related work.
attack [168] which showed that CV models are vulnerable
to small, human imperceptible, perturbations to their input
images that cause a misclassification – and these perturbations
are relatively computationally cheap to create, requiring only a
single back-propagation instead of a costly optimization loop.
This manipulation of the model’s inputs to achieve a goal such
as misclassification (not classified as the true class of the input)
or targeted misclassification (forcing the model to classify the
input as a specific and different class) is termed an evasion
attack and is the most widely studied sub-field of Adversarial
ML, including in RFML.
It should also be noted that while this section focuses
primarily on attacks on signal classification, the adversarial
attacks can be more broadly applied to other RFML tasks.
Generally speaking, an evasion attack influences the input of
a DNN to change its output. Therefore, any application of
DNNs for spectrum sensing or cognitive radio discussed in
Section II is susceptible to attack.
1) Evasion: Evasion attacks are most prevalent in the study
of classification tasks where a key constraint in these attacks
is to ensure they remain imperceptible to the intended receiver,
which is uniquely defined in the context of wireless. Evasion
attacks can further be categorized as untargeted or targeted
digital attacks, as will be discussed further below.
a) Untargeted Digital Attacks: Untargeted digital attacks
can be defined as evasion attacks in which the goal is solely
misclassification. RFML models have been shown to be just
as vulnerable to these untargeted adversarial attacks as their
DNN counterparts in CV. Specifically, both [133] and [156]
showed that the FGSM attack is sufficient to completely evade
AMC by a DNN with a perturbation that is 10 dB below
the actual signal. While FGSM is a computationally cheap
method for creating adversarial examples, the large body of
literature in adversarial ML for CV has yielded algorithms
that can evade classifiers with even smaller perturbations. In
[159], a more sophisticated adversarial methodology [169] was
used to carry out an attack on AMC; not only was this attack
successful for a DNN, but, when the adversarial examples were
input to classifiers not based on DNNs (e.g. Support Vector
Machine (SVM), Decision Trees, Random Forests, etc.) the
models had similar decreases in accuracy. Therefore, although
adversarial ML methodologies use DNNs to craft adversarial
examples due to the need for back propagation, they are
transferable across various classification methodologies. Thus,
the perturbations cannot simply be noise specific to a DNN
model, they must be changing something inherent to the
signal properties that are used by many methodologies for
classification.
b) Targeted Digital Attacks: As previously mentioned,
the goal of targeted digital attacks is to force a model to make
a specific misclassification. By more closely examining how
AMC DNNs break down under evasion attacks, other work
has also shown that Adversarial ML takes advantage of some-
thing inherent to the properties of man-made signals. More
specifically, modulation formats for wireless communications
are man made; thus, they can be intuitively grouped into a
hierarchical structure. For instance, analog modulations, such
as the Amplitude Modulation and Frequency Modulation used
in older vehicle radios, are distinctly separate from digital
modulations used to carry discrete symbols representing the
bits of a data transmission. Within digital modulations, the
formats can be hierarchically grouped into whether they repre-
sent symbols in the frequency domain (Frequency Shift Keying
(FSK)), in the signal’s phase (Phase Shift Keying (PSK)), or in
both the signal’s phase and amplitude (Quadrature Amplitude
Modulation (QAM)). One would expect that a DNN would
learn this intuitive grouping as well and therefore it would
more easily confuse an analog modulation with another analog
modulation than it would mislabel an analog modulation as
a digital transmission. In fact, [153] used the Momentum
Iterative FGSM [170] attack to show that this is precisely
the case. The authors showed that higher power adversarial
perturbations are required to move between source/target pairs
belonging to different coarse-grained categories than to target
a class belonging to the same category as the source signal.
c) Rubbish Class Examples/Fooling Images: Other re-
search has considered the ability to create examples that
are classified as some target class but have no semantic
meaning, commonly referred to as Rubbish Class Examples
[168], Fooling Images [171], or, in the context of wireless
communications, Spoofing Attacks [172]. While a Spoofing
Attack may provide benefits over a simpler Relay Attack by
considering channel and receiver effects in the adversarial
transmission, no communication can occur using such an
attack. Therefore, the benefits of such an attack would be
limited and the more prevalent threat is considering how
signals can be manipulated without losing their underlying
semantic meaning.
d) Defining Perceptible Perturbations in Wireless: The
main constraint in adversarial machine learning is generally
provided, particularly in CV, as a constraint on the pertur-
bation power, a proxy for the notion of perceptibility of
the perturbation (e.g. does this perturbation affect a human
observer’s judgement of the image, interpretation of the audio
signal content, or reading of a sentence). This notion is more
easily defined in RFML as the Bit Error Rate (BER) at a
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the perturbation being applied, BER defines the perceptibility
of the adversarial attack [156] (i.e. the more obvious the
perturbation, the higher the BER). Therefore, recent work
has created differentiable versions of receive chains, that
allow for the BER to be directly incorporated into the loss
function of an adversarial attack [155], [157]. Thus, even
though attacks transferred from CV may have lower utility
in wireless communications due to their large impact on the
wireless transmission, the attackers will continue to evolve
specifically in the context of RFML, leading to more sophis-
ticated threats. As such, defenses must be investigated that
mitigate future threats to RFML systems being deployed in
high risk adversarial environments.
2) Defense: Defending against adversarial attacks can be
roughly split into two categories, discussed further in the
following subsections:
i. detecting an attack is occurring in order to take counter-
measures, or
ii. becoming robust to attacks by increasing the power of
the perturbation required to cause a misclassification.
While this section only focuses on the work that has been
done specifically for RFML in the context of adversarial
evasion attacks, more general surveys on adversarial attacks
and defenses are provided in [161], [173]. Further, a more
general discussion of detecting whether an example is in
distribution is left to Section V.
a) Detecting Attacks: Detecting an attack can be thought
of as a supplemental binary classification that determines
is this example in or out of distribution? Two metrics are
proposed in [174] for detecting adversarial attacks on wireless
communications. The first uses the distribution of the Peak-to-
Average Power Ratio (PAPR) of the underlying signal along
with the model’s classification. Since the PAPR can be used
as a signature for a given modulation, the work in [174] tests
whether the DNN classification and PAPR signature are in
agreement on the classification; if not, then the example is
assumed to be an adversarial example. This test is specific to
the RFML task, AMC, but agnostic of the model used. The
second test uses the distribution of the output probabilities of
the DNN to determine whether an example is in or out of
distribution and is therefore agnostic of the task it is applied
to. However, performing statistical tests during inference can
increase system complexity on an already Size, Weight, and
Power (SWaP) constrained RFML system (discussed further
in Section VI) leading to increased classification latency and
thus decreased bandwidths that can be sensed in real time.
Additionally, this additional check can be incorporated into
the attack, once the attacker has become aware, and likely by-
passed just as the original classification was [175]. Therefore,
pushing the defense methodology into the training stage of the
DNN, where the computational complexity can be handled off
target and without a time constraint, is often beneficial.
b) Becoming Robust to Attacks: The most widely used
methodology for gaining robustness is adversarial training
[168], [176]–[179]. Adversarial training is simply the introduc-
tion of correctly labeled adversarial examples during training
time by a known adversarial attack (such as FGSM). Another
method that alters the training strategy of DNNs to confer
robustness is to reduce the degrees of freedom of an attacker by
lowering the input dimensionality. The work in [180] adopted
both strategies for training and observed that it increased the
model’s robustness to FGSM attacks. The results of [180]
also showed that lowering the input dimensionality alone was
sufficient to increase robustness to an FGSM attack; however,
that adversarial training decreased the number of training
epochs needed to reach near perfect accuracy on legitimate
examples. This highlights that adversarial training is not only
good for conferring robustness, but can also be used a data
augmentation technique for RFML (Section III). However, no
work (yet) has shown that an adversarially trained classifier
would be robust to all attack methodologies [170].
c) Moving Towards Mathematically Rigorous Definitions
of Robustness: Given that many proposed defenses have
been quickly proven to be inadequate, it is important to be
overly cautious when evaluating a new methodology [181]. In
addition to evaluating defenses against a huge, and growing,
list of adversarial attacks (using an open source library such as
Cleverhans can help alleviate the development burden [182])
research has begun looking into provable robustness. One such
work is [183] that uses the Lipschitz function of DNNs to
provide a lower bound on the adversarial distance needed
to cause a misclassification. More generally, this concept is
about whether the model can be trusted on real inputs, where
the inputs are distorted by some perturbation, regardless of
whether the perturbations are man-made or naturally occur-
ring. Therefore, this discussion is deferred to Section V.
B. Mitigation Through Standard Security Practices
Defending a RFML system from attack does not have to
only revolve around adversarial ML based defenses. By using
standard cybersecurity best practices, an adversary can be
forced to move down the Threat Model presented in Figure 3
by having their knowledge of and access to the RFML system
limited. Therefore, the attacks become much more difficult to
successfully execute.
More specifically, most adversarial attacks and defenses are
proposed and evaluated in a fully digital world (a digital
attack in Figure 3); however, such attacks and defenses can
transfer to the physical environment as well [184]. In the
context of RFML, this physical environment means that the
perturbation is radiated from an external transmitter. Therefore,
the transmission is impacted by channel effects, hardware
impairments at both the transmitter and receiver, and DSP
pre-preprocessing techniques before reaching the DNN for
classification (a physical attack in Figure 3). All of these can
serve as an impediment for an attacker, forcing them to raise
their adversarial perturbation power in order to overcome the
effects [156], [157], [159], [185].
Additionally, so-called white-box attacks, which assume full
knowledge of the target DNN, are generally known to be more
effective than black-box attacks which assume close to zero
knowledge about the target, regardless of modality. This is not
meant to say that adversarial examples do not transfer between
models, only that when transferring adversarial examples
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is incurred. However, limiting the amount of information an
adversary can build up about the DNN is a critical first step
in defending against attack.
C. Discussion and Future Work
The broader community’s understanding of adversarial ex-
amples in terms of how to create and defend against them,
when to inject them into a DNN (training/inference), and why
they exist, is still rapidly evolving. Much of this discussion
can be applied generally across all data modalities; however,
RFML provides unique considerations that must also be stud-
ied separately:
i. the physical channels between adversary and receiver are
significantly different,
ii. the perceptability of the perturbation is machine defined,
not human defined, and
iii. the actions taken based on the generated knowledge are
application specific.
Due to i. and ii., adversarial attacks from other modalities
are of limited concern to deployed RFML systems as the
wireless channel forces the adversary to increase the per-
turbation power to a level that significantly interferes with
the primary objective of the transmission: to communicate.
Ongoing work has shown that more sophisticated attacks will
emerge to overcome these limitations by incorporating more
expert knowledge (i.e. channel type [186], channel coding
scheme [187], device type [188]) into the adversarial process.
Another key research direction going forward is determining
what information is emitted from a RFML device, such as
acknowledgement messages or transmission decisions [188],
[189], that can aid in online learning for increased attack
effectiveness. Finally, a major benefit of a RFML controlled
radio over a traditionally deterministic policy based approach
is the ability of the radio to continually learn and adapt to
its specific environment. Thus, the recent work in determining
how the training data of RFML systems can be manipulated
to cause a degradation in model performance [152], [190]
will motivate the study of data cleaning methodologies for
wireless.
V. TRUST AND ASSURANCE
For all RFML applications (Section II), there is a desire to
translate laboratory performance into a user-defined mission
assurance. This is critical to not only assuring that the machine
learned behaviors, which are difficult to reverse engineer,
behave as expected when put to practice, but more importantly,
understanding how the system will respond to unanticipated
stimuli and/or recognizing that an input is outside the training
set of its learned responses. Taking this need to an extreme, a
significant amount of end-user confidence is required to give
RFML systems the authority to permit autonomous weapons
release [191].
In most current RFML techniques evaluated, learned be-
haviors are a function of correlation rather than causation.
That is, algorithms are data-driven, and thereby assume that
the training, validation, and test datasets used to develop said
Figure 4: An example of in-set, near-set, and out-of-set data
types for an RFML algorithm trained on BPSK signals with
SNRs between 0dB and 10dB.
algorithm are drawn from the same distribution which will be
seen once deployed. A primary concern for early adopters of
RFML is how the algorithm will behave when this assumption
is invalid, either due to the real-world considerations not
present in the training data or adversarial attack as discussed
in Sections III, IV, and VI.
In other words, we can categorize inputs in one of three
ways, illustrated in Figure 4:
• in-set - Those that match the distribution of the training
data. Using modulation classification as an example, an
in-set input is a known modulation scheme under the
same channel effects, SNR, transmitter/receiver imperfec-
tions, etc. that were seen during training.
• near-set - Those close to the distribution of the training
dataset, but not included. In our modulation classification
example, near-set inputs might be a trained modulation
scheme, but different channel effects or SNR.
• out-of-set - Those completely outside of the distribution
of the training data. Completing our example, an out-of-
set example would be an untrained modulation scheme.
A data-driven RFML system will behave as expected on
in-set inputs, but is unpredictable on near-set input values,
and necessarily incorrect in processing all out-of-set input
values. This points to a critical need for approaches to both
rigorously assure “the safety and functional correctness” of
RFML systems throughout deployment [192] and explain or
understand the behavior of RFML systems [193].
These concerns are not unique to RFML [194], but have yet
to be adequately addressed in RFML literature. Therefore, this
section will focus on the very young body of work in testing,
verification, and interpretation of general ML systems which
could be explored for use in the RF domain, and will discuss
the pros and cons of the various approaches. These works can
broadly be categorized into three research areas,
• verification methods which provide mathematical proof
that a desired property holds for a trained model,
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• testing methods which aim to exhaustively evaluate a
trained model to identify flaws, and
• interpretation/explanation techniques which include
methods to describe and/or quantify a trained
model’s learned behaviors in a human-understandable
format, such as decision/model explanations or
uncertainty/reliability metrics.
A. Verification
Beginning with the most rigorous approaches, current meth-
ods for verifying ML algorithms apply formal methods such
as constraint solving [195]–[197], global optimization [198],
search-based methods [199], and over approximation [200]
to provide provable guarantees about their behavior when
provided with in-set, near-set, out-of-set, and even adversarial
examples. While verification methods provide deterministic or
statistical guarantees of the robustness of previously trained
models, they are also typically NP hard or extremely compu-
tationally expensive and time intensive. As a result, none have
been able to successfully scale to the state-of-the-art deep NNs
used today.
Towards scalable ML verification methods, a promising path
forward is that of approximate or iterative/anytime methods
which provide provable upper/lower bounds or monotonically
converging bounds [197]–[200]. However, future work is
needed to improve these methods, in order to yield tighter
and more useful bounds on the robustness of trained models.
B. Testing
Traditionally, ML researchers and engineers rely on a held-
out test set, which remains unseen throughout the training and
model selection process, to provide an estimate of a trained
model’s performance [201]. This computationally efficient
method provides a good estimate of how the model will
perform on in-set data, but fails to identify how the model
will perform on near-set or out-of-set data.
In an effort to strike a balance between computational
efficiency and rigorousness, there is a growing body of
work adapting and applying software testing and debugging
techniques to more thoroughly test ML algorithms. These
approaches generate test cases using methods such as con-
colic testing [202], [203], mutation testing [204], differential
analysis [205], or even adversarial methods [206], which is
typically guided by a user-selected coverage metric. Some of
the most popular coverage metrics used have included neuron
or layer coverage [207], [208] and modified condition/decision
coverage [202]. The aim is to generate a set of test cases/inputs
which provide sufficient coverage of the trained model, dic-
tated by a user-selected threshold.
Though test case generation may provide more assurance
than traditional ML testing practices and are typically more
computationally efficient than verification methods, there are
a number of drawbacks which should be addressed. First
and foremost, like traditional software testing methods, ML
testing methods can only identify a lack of robustness, and
cannot ensure robustness. In the same vein, the effectiveness
of the testing method is highly dependent upon the coverage
metrics and thresholds used, both of which are chosen by
the user. With some coverage metrics and thresholds, testing
methods may be just as computationally expensive and time
consuming in comparison to approximate verification methods.
Ultimately, while there is certainly value in more effective
testing techniques, future work will likely need to focus on
RFML verification over RFML testing, in order to effectively
mitigate against adversarial attack and provide assured perfor-
mance [209].
C. Interpretation/Explanation
Switching gears, the aim of interpretation/explanation meth-
ods is to address the challenge of Human-Machine Interaction
(HMI) by “enabl[ing] users to understand how the data is
processed and supports awareness of possible bias and systems
malfunctions” [210]. In other words, HMI becomes more
feasible if the model/decision is better understood by the
end user. Approaches to interpret or explain black-box ML
models such as deep NNs and/or their decisions can broadly
be categorized into two groups.
The first group of approaches provide intrinsic interpretabil-
ity by using inherently more interpretable models either from
the offset or extracted from a black box model [211]. Examples
of such models include decision trees [212], [213], attention
mechanisms [214], clustering algorithms, or linear/Bayesian
classifiers [215]. While these methods are typically the most
straightforward and provide the most useful model/decision
explanations, inherently interpretable models are typically less
expressive than black-box models such as deep NNs, and
therefore do not provide the same level of performance.
The second group of approaches provide post-hoc inter-
pretability by extracting decision/model explanations from
black-box models or through model exploration [210], [211].
Post-hoc interpretability methods can be further broken down
into local interpretability methods and global interpretability
methods. Local interpretability methods aim to provide an
explanation for why and/or how a black box model made the
decision it made for a given example input. These instance-
level explanations can be aggregated over a group of example
inputs to draw larger conclusions about a model’s knowledge.
Meanwhile global interpretability methods focus on increasing
the transparency of black-box models by “inspecting the
structures and parameters” in an effort to understand the scope
of the model’s knowledge more directly [211].
Local interpretability methods typically utilize some form
of visualization to describe the network’s response to the input
such as heatmaps, which indicate which portions of the exam-
ple input contributed most to the network’s decision [216],
[217]. Popular and successful local interpretability methods
in the image processing domain include backpropagation
techniques such as layerwise relevance propagation, Taylor
decomposition, and GradCAM [216], [218], [219], saliency
mapping [217], and deconvolutional networks [220]. However,
transitioning these methods to the RF domain has proven
challenging, as raw RF data is more difficult to visualize,
especially in the intermediate layers of a deep NN. Therefore,
a more promising local interpretability method for use in the
11
RF domain is the use of uncertainty metrics to accurately
quantify a model’s confidence in any given decision, and could
be used to identify unpredictability due to adversarial attack
or operating environments [221], [222].
Global interpretability methods focus less on visualization
techniques due to the large number of parameters in deep NN
models, but have been explored through approaches such as
activation maximization and partial dependence [217], [223]–
[225]. More common is the use of metrics such as feature
importance [226], [227], sensitivity [228], [229], and mutual
information [230].
The primary challenge shared amongst both local and
global interpretability methods is that there are no universal
definitions for terms such as trust, interpretability, assurance,
and explanation in the deep learning literature. Furthermore,
the concept of interpretability is highly dependent on the end
user and their technical background [231]. For example, some
argue that while global interpretability methods are useful to
the deep learning expert who understands the inner-workings
of a black-box model, local interpretability methods are more
tangible, intuitive, and provide more benefit to the end user.
Furthermore, trust, interpretability, assurance, and explanation
are largely gauged qualitatively rather than quantitatively, and
therefore are hard to compare and evaluate across approaches
[210].
Additional challenges to ML interpretations include, but are
not limited to [194]:
• How to accurately characterize and/or classify out-of-set
examples. This is one area where uncertainty metrics
would likely be more useful than visualization based
explanation methods
• Producing consistent explanations for similar inputs
• Producing explanations without significant computational
overhead
• Deep NN produce an overwhelming amount of highly
complex and interdependent data that is difficult to visu-
alize, describe, and/or explain in a helpful manner. The
abstract nature of RF data only exacerbates this challenge.
D. Discussion
Trust/assurance in RFML systems will likely require some
form of both verification method in conjunction with in-
terpretation/explanation methods [232], in order to provide
designer, administrator, operator, and end-user confidence in a
model’s decision-making capabilities both before and during
deployment. As discussed above, interpretation/explanation
methods provide the user with an intuitive and/or quantifiable
level of confidence in a model’s decision, improving their
understanding of and trust in the system. While this under-
standing and trust is critical to HMI, assured RFML suitable
for use in safety-critical systems, such as self-driving cars
and military systems, will require the rigorous guarantees that
verification provides.
VI. DEPLOYMENT
Early adoption of RFML systems has already taken place in
a variety of military systems [2], [122], [233], [234], though
a broader interest will exist for the rollout of commercial
cellular [235]–[237], the IoT [103], [238]–[240], and even
satellite communications [241]–[243]. Given the breadth of
applications identified for RF machine learning techniques
given in Section II, there is a fundamental desire to transi-
tion the developed techniques to real systems. This section
evaluates the practical constraints of size, weight, power, cost,
and performance bounds to facilitate deployment.
A. Size, Weight, Power, and Cost (SWaP-C)
Beginning with size and weight, it is notable that many
DL techniques employ significant computing infrastructures
during their training phases, the scope of which makes them
infeasible for training in the field; however, we are most
concerned with the DL algorithm’s computational require-
ments when attempting to process incoming, unknown, data
inputs once deployed post training [244]. One advantage
of RFML techniques, as compared to most CV techniques,
is that the sizes of the associate NNs and processing are
drastically smaller – in many cases 2-3 orders of magnitude
smaller in terms of number of parameters and thus memory
utilization. Further, some RFML implementations incorporate
pre-calculated traditional signal processing techniques such
as Fourier and wavelet transforms, cyclostationary feature
estimators, and other expert features to serve as a more
efficient feature that may be merged with machine learned
behaviors [241], [245], [246]. Other research has focused
on reduced precision implementations of machine learning
structures as a method to gain computational efficiency [247]–
[249]. However, the use of online learning techniques in RF
scenarios requires real-time computational resources that are
currently difficult to reduce to a mobile system [250], [251],
in addition to the challenges discussed in Section III.
Given the highly effective miniaturization of digital elec-
tronics, a deployed system’s weight is primarily driven by its
power consumption and the associated batteries or heatsinks
[252]. As such, real-time evaluation of signal detection [253],
signal characterization [122], and specific emitter identification
[103] have each been evaluated, with the latter two being
implementable to a tactical/mobile use case, either through
the assumption of vehicle power or a tightly regulated and
small duty cycle. Driving system criteria for this power usage
include the instantaneous bandwidth of the spectrum analyzed,
the density of signals within the environment (affecting the
number of calls to an RFML function), implementation in
software versus hardware, and the environment where the
device is used. The use of wake-up circuits for periodic/event-
triggered execution of a RFML function can be used to
drastically reduce average power draw [103]. Additionally, the
use of energy harvesting techniques, and RFML processing
within those energy production envelopes, are of particular
interest for battery-powered IoT and solar-powered satellites.
Beyond SWaP, cost is typically the next important de-
ployment consideration. To date, the primary cost of RFML
systems appears to be underlying datasets used for training,
followed by the training process and hardware, and finally by
the fieldsets to be deployed. As discussed previously in Section
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III, the quality of the data drives overall functionality, and
often requires human-intensive labeling and/or pre-processing
[2]. Training costs are primarily driven by the purchase and
use of parallelized processors such as Graphics Processing
Units, Tensor Processing Units, or other special purpose
hardware. Both the data collection and training processes can
be amortized over the number of fieldsets – in current military
deployments, the number of deployed units is typically small,
making the relative cost per mobile fieldset high. By contrast,
deployment for a widely used 5G/6G cellular application
will be make the training costs, if broadly applicable, nearly
negligible.
B. Application Dependencies
As described in Sections II and III, the scale and scope
of different applications can lead to vastly different hardware
and SWaP requirements – at one end of the spectrum a
Raspberry Pi 0 for performing event-triggered packet-based
SEI for IoT networks [103] and on the other end a real-time
5 GHz instantaneous continuous spectrum monitoring system
[2]. One specific application example, driven by environmental
effects, is the potential deployment of ML algorithms aboard
small spacecraft, which are impacted by radiation-induced
single event upsets [254], [255] – without the addition of
radiation shielding and/or extensive mitigation strategies, the
performance of the ML structures fail to achieve the necessary
performance [256]–[261] to be practically useful. Broader de-
pendencies include harnessing the more rapid decision making
of RFML - in many applications discussed in Section II, the
envisioned use case for RFML is primarily as a decision aid.
Additional work will be required to make the raw observables
fully actionable in live systems.
C. Open Questions for Deployment
In addition to those described previously in this section, we
see the need for future research that addresses the following
capabilities before RFML algorithms can supplant existing
techniques.
• Online, incremental, and transfer learning techniques:
current training processes generally assume up front
training with a defined set of signal classes or RF
environmental conditions. Work is needed to add new
signals or emitters without repeating the training process,
as discussed previously in Section III.
• New processing capabilities: expanding upon work for
reduced-precision implementations of neural nets, re-
search is needed to evaluate more computationally ef-
ficient designs, such as pruning, bit-slice processor ar-
chitectures for offline/intermittent calculation, potential
insertion of RFML math co-processors during execution
stages, etc.
• Online learning: given the real-time nature of spectral
observations, there is a need to improve the efficiency and
timeline of online learning that absorbs new information
into the trained behaviors.
• Distributed RFML: most current work is focused on
individual nodes, yet many RF systems offer the potential
of multiple apertures whose spectrum observations can
be integrated to gain a larger system picture, as briefly
mentioned in the context of transfer learning in Section
III. Example applications for expansion include multi-
node geo-location and transfer learning using compressed
samples or intermediate outputs of the RFML processing.
• Human interaction with RFML: beyond individual de-
cisions for signal detection or classification, additional
work is needed in helping the end user understand the
limits of the learned behaviors, how to shape and/or
optimize use the system, and how to visualize and/or
verify whether the machine should be trusted, a topic
further explored in Section V.
• Confidence: also discussed further in Section V as well
as in Section IV, additional work is required to identify
in real-time if prior training is truly representative of
decisions requested as well as the quality of the result-
ing decision (i.e. consistency with laboratory-calculated
performance) in order to provide assured performance, as
well as to begin ruggedizing the decision chain against
spoofing and other adversarial techniques
VII. CONCLUSION
As shown in Section II, RFML is a rapidly growing area
of research, due to its demonstrated success in improving and
automating spectrum sensing applications and supporting next-
generation cognitive/intelligent radio applications. However,
these works have primarily focused on conforming existing
image or natural language processing solutions to an RF
application, each making their own assumptions about dataset
availability, use cases, etc, and often ignoring key considera-
tions, common to all RFML solutions, that must be addressed
in order to make deployable RFML technologies realizable.
In this work, these common considerations, termed the
“RFML Ecosystem” were defined as the application itself
(Section II), dataset creation (Section III), security (Section
IV), trust and assurance (Section V), and deployment (Sec-
tion VI). For each element of the ecosystem, along with an
overview of the topic, the primary research areas were identi-
fied with examples of existing works. Additionally, discussion
of dependencies between the elements of the RFML ecosys-
tem provide a comprehensive and integrated summary of the
domain-specific challenges to applying DL to RF. In whole,
this work aims to be a holistic guide for RFML developers
looking to develop realizable and deployable solutions for real-
world applications and to promote the advancement of ML
architectures and algorithms purpose-built for the RF domain.
REFERENCES
[1] M. E. Morocho-Cayamcela, H. Lee, and W. Lim, “Machine learning for
5G/B5G mobile and wireless communications: Potential, limitations,
and future directions,” IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 137 184–137 206, 2019.
[2] T. Rondeau, “Radio frequency machine learning systems
(RFMLS).” [Online]. Available: https://www.darpa.mil/program/
radio-frequency-machine-learning-systems
[3] M. Alshawaqfeh, X. Wang, A. R. Ekti, M. Z. Shakir, K. Qaraqe,
and E. Serpedin, “A survey of machine learning algorithms and
their applications in cognitive radio,” in International Conference on
Cognitive Radio Oriented Wireless Networks. Springer, 2015, pp.
790–801.
13
[4] H. K. Jhajj, R. Garg, and N. Saluja, “Aspects of machine learning in
cognitive radio networks,” in Progress in Advanced Computing and
Intelligent Engineering, K. Saeed, N. Chaki, B. Pati, S. Bakshi, and
D. P. Mohapatra, Eds. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018, pp. 553–
559.
[5] M. A. Alsheikh, S. Lin, D. Niyato, and H. Tan, “Machine learning
in wireless sensor networks: Algorithms, strategies, and applications,”
IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 1996–
2018, Fourthquarter 2014.
[6] R. Boutaba, M. A. Salahuddin, N. Limam, S. Ayoubi, N. Shahriar,
F. Estrada-Solano, and O. M. Caicedo, “A comprehensive survey on
machine learning for networking: evolution, applications and research
opportunities,” Journal of Internet Services and Applications, vol. 9,
no. 1, p. 16, 2018.
[7] Y. Sun, M. Peng, Y. Zhou, Y. Huang, and S. Mao, “Application
of machine learning in wireless networks: Key techniques and open
issues,” IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials, vol. 21, no. 4, pp.
3072–3108, Fourthquarter 2019.
[8] Ma Di and Er Meng Joo, “A survey of machine learning in wireless
sensor networks from networking and application perspectives,” in
2007 6th International Conference on Information, Communications
Signal Processing, Dec 2007, pp. 1–5.
[9] Q. Mao, F. Hu, and Q. Hao, “Deep learning for intelligent wireless
networks: A comprehensive survey,” IEEE Communications Surveys
Tutorials, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 2595–2621, Fourthquarter 2018.
[10] C. Clancy, J. Hecker, E. Stuntebeck, and T. O’Shea, “Applications
of machine learning to cognitive radio networks,” IEEE Wireless
Communications, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 47–52, August 2007.
[11] G. P. Joshi, S. Y. Nam, and S. W. Kim, “Cognitive radio wireless
sensor networks: applications, challenges and research trends,” Sensors,
vol. 13, no. 9, pp. 11 196–11 228, 2013.
[12] T. Erpek, T. J. O’Shea, Y. E. Sagduyu, Y. Shi, and T. C. Clancy,
Deep Learning for Wireless Communications. Cham: Springer
International Publishing, 2020, pp. 223–266. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31764-5 9
[13] T. O’Shea and J. Hoydis, “An introduction to deep learning for the
physical layer,” IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and
Networking, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 563–575, 2017.
[14] M. Chen, U. Challita, W. Saad, C. Yin, and M. Debbah, “Artificial
neural networks-based machine learning for wireless networks: A
tutorial,” IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials, vol. 21, no. 4, pp.
3039–3071, Fourthquarter 2019.
[15] M. Bkassiny, Y. Li, and S. K. Jayaweera, “A survey on machine-
learning techniques in cognitive radios,” IEEE Communications Sur-
veys Tutorials, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 1136–1159, Third 2013.
[16] C. Jiang, H. Zhang, Y. Ren, Z. Han, K. Chen, and L. Hanzo,
“Machine learning paradigms for next-generation wireless networks,”
IEEE Wireless Communications, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 98–105, April 2017.
[17] O. Simeone, “A very brief introduction to machine learning with appli-
cations to communication systems,” IEEE Transactions on Cognitive
Communications and Networking, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 648–664, Dec 2018.
[18] T. J. O’shea and N. West, “Radio machine learning dataset generation
with GNU Radio,” in Proceedings of the GNU Radio Conference,
vol. 1, no. 1, 2016.
[19] M. G. Kibria, K. Nguyen, G. P. Villardi, O. Zhao, K. Ishizu, and F. Ko-
jima, “Big data analytics, machine learning, and artificial intelligence
in next-generation wireless networks,” IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 32 328–
32 338, 2018.
[20] T. Tuukkanen and J. Anteroinen, “Framework to develop military
operational understanding of cognitive radio,” in 2015 International
Conference on Military Communications and Information Systems
(ICMCIS), May 2015, pp. 1–9.
[21] J. Sen, “Security and privacy challenges in cognitive wireless sensor
networks,” in Cognitive Radio Technology Applications for Wireless
and Mobile Ad hoc Networks. IGI Global, 2013, pp. 194–232.
[22] S. K. Sharma, T. E. Bogale, S. Chatzinotas, B. Ottersten, L. B. Le, and
X. Wang, “Cognitive radio techniques under practical imperfections: A
survey,” IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials, vol. 17, no. 4, pp.
1858–1884, Fourthquarter 2015.
[23] S. Mohammed, R. El Abdessamad, R. Saadane, and K. A. Hatim,
“Performance evaluation of spectrum sensing implementation using
artificial neural networks and energy detection method,” in 2018
International Conference on Electronics, Control, Optimization and
Computer Science (ICECOCS), Dec 2018, pp. 1–6.
[24] M. R. Vyas, D. K. Patel, and M. Lopez-Benitez, “Artificial neural
network based hybrid spectrum sensing scheme for cognitive radio,” in
2017 IEEE 28th Annual International Symposium on Personal, Indoor,
and Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC), Oct 2017, pp. 1–7.
[25] T. J. O’Shea, T. Roy, and T. Erpek, “Spectral detection and localization
of radio events with learned convolutional neural features,” in 2017
25th European Signal Processing Conference (EUSIPCO), Aug 2017,
pp. 331–335.
[26] D. Pu, Y. Shi, A. V. Ilyashenko, and A. M. Wyglinski, “Detecting
primary user emulation attack in cognitive radio networks,” in 2011
IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference - GLOBECOM 2011,
Dec 2011, pp. 1–5.
[27] S. Yi, H. Wang, W. Xue, X. Fan, L. Wang, J. Tian, and R. Matsukura,
“Interference source identification for IEEE 802.15.4 wireless sensor
networks using deep learning,” in 2018 IEEE 29th Annual International
Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications
(PIMRC), Sep. 2018, pp. 1–7.
[28] F. Ge, Q. Chen, Y. Wang, C. W. Bostian, T. W. Rondeau, and B. Le,
“Cognitive radio: From spectrum sharing to adaptive learning and
reconfiguration,” in 2008 IEEE Aerospace Conference, March 2008,
pp. 1–10.
[29] S. S. Fernandes, M. R. Makiuchi, M. V. Lamar, and J. L. Bordim,
“An adaptive recurrent neural network model dedicated to opportunistic
communication in wireless networks,” in 2018 International Joint
Conference on Neural Networks (IJCNN), July 2018, pp. 01–08.
[30] A. Subekti, H. F. Pardede, R. Sustika, and Suyoto, “Spectrum sensing
for cognitive radio using deep autoencoder neural network and SVM,”
in 2018 International Conference on Radar, Antenna, Microwave,
Electronics, and Telecommunications (ICRAMET), Nov 2018, pp. 81–
85.
[31] F. Wunsch, F. Paisana, S. Rajendran, A. Selim, P. Alvarez, S. Mu¨ller,
S. Koslowski, B. Van den Bergh, and S. Pollin, “DySPAN spectrum
challenge: Situational awareness and opportunistic spectrum access
benchmarked,” IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and
Networking, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 550–562, Sep. 2017.
[32] D. Han, G. C. Sobabe, C. Zhang, X. Bai, Z. Wang, S. Liu, and B. Guo,
“Spectrum sensing for cognitive radio based on convolution neural
network,” in 2017 10th International Congress on Image and Signal
Processing, BioMedical Engineering and Informatics (CISP-BMEI),
Oct 2017, pp. 1–6.
[33] R. G. Yelalwar and Y. Ravinder, “Artificial neural network based
approach for spectrum sensing in cognitive radio,” in 2018 Interna-
tional Conference on Wireless Communications, Signal Processing and
Networking (WiSPNET), March 2018, pp. 1–5.
[34] T. Nawaz, L. Marcenaro, and C. S. Regazzoni, “Cyclostationary-based
jammer detection for wideband radios using compressed sensing and
artificial neural network,” International Journal of Distributed Sensor
Networks, vol. 13, no. 12, p. 1550147717748900, 2017.
[35] H. Liu, X. Zhu, and T. Fujii, “Cyclostationary based full-duplex
spectrum sensing using adversarial training for convolutional neural
networks,” in 2019 International Conference on Artificial Intelligence
in Information and Communication (ICAIIC), Feb 2019, pp. 369–374.
[36] T. O’Shea, T. Roy, and T. C. Clancy, “Learning robust general radio
signal detection using computer vision methods,” in 2017 51st Asilomar
Conference on Signals, Systems, and Computers, Oct 2017, pp. 829–
832.
[37] T. Chen, J. Liu, L. Xiao, and L. Huang, “Anti-jamming transmissions
with learning in heterogenous cognitive radio networks,” in 2015
IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference Work-
shops (WCNCW), March 2015, pp. 293–298.
[38] L. Bixio, M. Ottonello, H. Sallam, M. Raffetto, and C. S. Regazzoni,
“Signal classification based on spectral redundancy and neural network
ensembles,” in 2009 4th International Conference on Cognitive Radio
Oriented Wireless Networks and Communications, June 2009, pp. 1–6.
[39] S. Kim and G. B. Giannakis, “Dynamic learning for cognitive radio
sensing,” in 2013 5th IEEE International Workshop on Computational
Advances in Multi-Sensor Adaptive Processing (CAMSAP), Dec 2013,
pp. 388–391.
[40] A. Tsakmalis, S. Chatzinotas, and B. Ottersten, “Automatic modu-
lation classification for adaptive power control in cognitive satellite
communications,” in 2014 7th Advanced Satellite Multimedia Systems
Conference and the 13th Signal Processing for Space Communications
Workshop (ASMS/SPSC), Sep. 2014, pp. 234–240.
[41] A. N. Mody, S. R. Blatt, D. G. Mills, T. P. Mcelwain, N. B.
Thammakhoune, J. D. Niedzwiecki, M. J. Sherman, C. S. Myers, and
P. D. Fiore, “Recent advances in cognitive communications,” IEEE
Communications Magazine, vol. 45, no. 10, pp. 54–61, October 2007.
14
[42] K. Davaslioglu and Y. E. Sagduyu, “Generative adversarial learning for
spectrum sensing,” in 2018 IEEE Int. Conf. on Commun. (ICC), 2018,
Conference Proceedings, pp. 1–6.
[43] M. Schmidt, D. Block, and U. Meier, “Wireless interference iden-
tification with convolutional neural networks,” in 2017 IEEE 15th
International Conference on Industrial Informatics (INDIN), July 2017,
pp. 180–185.
[44] T. J. O’Shea, T. Roy, and T. C. Clancy, “Over-the-air deep learning
based radio signal classification,” IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in
Signal Processing, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 168–179, 2018.
[45] F. He, X. Xu, L. Zhou, and H. Man, “A learning based cognitive
radio receiver,” in 2011 - MILCOM 2011 Military Communications
Conference, Nov 2011, pp. 7–12.
[46] S. C. Hauser, W. C. Headley, and A. J. Michaels, “Signal detection
effects on deep neural networks utilizing raw IQ for modulation clas-
sification,” in MILCOM 2017 - 2017 IEEE Military Communications
Conference (MILCOM), Oct 2017, pp. 121–127.
[47] D. Hong, Z. Zhang, and X. Xu, “Automatic modulation classification
using recurrent neural networks,” in 2017 3rd IEEE International
Conference on Computer and Communications (ICCC), Dec 2017, pp.
695–700.
[48] Y. Wu, X. Li, and J. Fang, “A deep learning approach for modulation
recognition via exploiting temporal correlations,” in 2018 IEEE 19th
International Workshop on Signal Processing Advances in Wireless
Communications (SPAWC), 2018, pp. 1–5.
[49] Z. Li, R. Liu, X. Lin, and H. Shi, “Detection of frequency-hopping
signals based on deep neural networks,” in 2018 IEEE 3rd International
Conference on Communication and Information Systems (ICCIS), Dec
2018, pp. 49–52.
[50] K. Yashashwi, A. Sethi, and P. Chaporkar, “A learnable distortion
correction module for modulation recognition,” IEEE Wireless Com-
munications Letters, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 77–80, Feb 2019.
[51] T. J. O’Shea, J. Corgan, and T. C. Clancy, “Convolutional Radio Mod-
ulation Recognition Networks,” arXiv e-prints, p. arXiv:1602.04105,
Feb 2016.
[52] N. E. West and T. O’Shea, “Deep architectures for modulation recog-
nition,” in 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum
Access Networks (DySPAN), March 2017, pp. 1–6.
[53] Y. Zhang, T. Liu, L. Zhang, and K. Wang, “A deep learning approach
for modulation recognition,” in 2018 IEEE 23rd International Confer-
ence on Digital Signal Processing (DSP), Nov 2018, pp. 1–5.
[54] Y. Sang and L. A. Li, “Application of novel architectures for modu-
lation recognition,” in 2018 IEEE Asia Pacific Conference on Circuits
and Systems (APCCAS), Oct 2018, pp. 159–162.
[55] G. Vanhoy, N. Thurston, A. Burger, J. Breckenridge, and T. Bose, “Hi-
erarchical modulation classification using deep learning,” in MILCOM
2018 - 2018 IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM),
Oct 2018, pp. 20–25.
[56] W. H. Clark, V. Arndorfer, B. Tamir, D. Kim, C. Vives, H. Morris,
L. Wong, and W. C. Headley, “Developing RFML intuition: An auto-
matic modulation classification architecture case study,” in MILCOM
2019 - 2019 IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM),
2019, pp. 136–142.
[57] L. J. Wong, P. D. White, W. C. Headley, and A. J. Michaels, “Dis-
tributed automatic modulation classification with compressed data,”
in MILCOM 2019 - 2019 IEEE Military Communications Conference
(MILCOM), Oct 2019.
[58] T. C. Clancy and A. Khawar, “Security threats to signal classifiers using
self-organizing maps,” in 4th Int. Conf. on Cognitive Radio Oriented
Wireless Netw. and Commun., 2009, Conference Proceedings, pp. 1–6.
[59] Q. Cai, S. Chen, X. Li, N. Hu, H. He, Y. Yao, and J. Mitola, “An
integrated incremental self-organizing map and hierarchical neural net-
work approach for cognitive radio learning,” in The 2010 International
Joint Conference on Neural Networks (IJCNN), July 2010, pp. 1–6.
[60] K. P. K. Reddy, Y. Yeleswarapu, and S. J. Darak, “Performance
evaluation of cumulant feature based automatic modulation classifier
on USRP testbed,” in 2017 9th International Conference on Commu-
nication Systems and Networks (COMSNETS), Jan 2017, pp. 393–394.
[61] K. A. A. Kumar, “SoC implementation of a modulation classification
module for cognitive radios,” in 2016 International Conference on
Communication Systems and Networks (ComNet), July 2016, pp. 87–
92.
[62] G. J. Mendis, J. Wei, and A. Madanayake, “Deep learning based
radio-signal identification with hardware design,” IEEE Transactions
on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, pp. 1–1, 2019.
[63] N. Bitar, S. Muhammad, and H. H. Refai, “Wireless technology
identification using deep convolutional neural networks,” in 2017 IEEE
28th Annual International Symposium on Personal, Indoor, and Mobile
Radio Communications (PIMRC), Oct 2017, pp. 1–6.
[64] J. Pajarinen, J. Peltonen, and M. A. Uusitalo, “Fault tolerant
machine learning for nanoscale cognitive radio,” Neurocomputing,
vol. 74, no. 5, pp. 753 – 764, 2011. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0925231210004108
[65] A. Nandi and E. Azzouz, “Modulation recognition using artificial
neural networks,” Signal Processing, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 165 –
175, 1997. [Online]. Available: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/S016516849600165X
[66] A. Fehske, J. Gaeddert, and J. H. Reed, “A new approach to signal
classification using spectral correlation and neural networks,” in First
IEEE International Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum
Access Networks, 2005. DySPAN 2005., Nov 2005, pp. 144–150.
[67] M. M. Ramo´n, T. Atwood, S. Barbin, and C. G. Christodoulou, “Signal
classification with an SVM-FFT approach for feature extraction in
cognitive radio,” in 2009 SBMO/IEEE MTT-S International Microwave
and Optoelectronics Conference (IMOC), Nov 2009, pp. 286–289.
[68] J. J. Popoola and R. v. Olst, “A novel modulation-sensing method,”
IEEE Vehicular Technology Magazine, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 60–69, Sep.
2011.
[69] M. M. T. Abdelreheem and M. O. Helmi, “Digital modulation clas-
sification through time and frequency domain features using neural
networks,” in 2012 IX International Symposium on Telecommunications
(BIHTEL), Oct 2012, pp. 1–5.
[70] S. Li, X. Wang, and J. Wang, “Manifold learning-based automatic
signal identification in cognitive radio networks,” IET Communications,
vol. 6, no. 8, pp. 955–963, May 2012.
[71] S. Peng, H. Jiang, H. Wang, H. Alwageed, and Y. Yao, “Modulation
classification using convolutional neural network based deep learning
model,” in 2017 26th Wireless and Optical Communication Conference
(WOCC), April 2017, pp. 1–5.
[72] G. J. Mendis, J. Wei, and A. Madanayake, “Deep learning-based
automated modulation classification for cognitive radio,” in 2016 IEEE
International Conference on Communication Systems (ICCS), Dec
2016, pp. 1–6.
[73] T. Nawaz, L. Marcenaro, and C. S. Regazzoni, “Stealthy jammer
detection algorithm for wide-band radios: A physical layer approach,”
in 2017 IEEE 13th International Conference on Wireless and Mobile
Computing, Networking and Communications (WiMob), Oct 2017, pp.
79–83.
[74] K. Karra, S. Kuzdeba, and J. Petersen, “Modulation recognition using
hierarchical deep neural networks,” in 2017 IEEE International Sympo-
sium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN), March 2017,
pp. 1–3.
[75] S. M. Hiremath, S. Deshmukh, R. Rakesh, and S. Kumar Patra, “Blind
identification of radio access techniques based on time-frequency
analysis and convolutional neural network,” in TENCON 2018 - 2018
IEEE Region 10 Conference, Oct 2018, pp. 1163–1167.
[76] B. Tang, Y. Tu, Z. Zhang, and Y. Lin, “Digital signal modulation
classification with data augmentation using generative adversarial nets
in cognitive radio networks,” IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 15 713–15 722,
2018.
[77] A. B. Ambaw, M. Bari, and M. Doroslovacˇki, “A case for stacked
autoencoder based order recognition of continuous-phase FSK,” in
2017 51st Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems
(CISS), March 2017, pp. 1–6.
[78] S. Peng, H. Jiang, H. Wang, H. Alwageed, Y. Zhou, M. M. Sebdani,
and Y. Yao, “Modulation classification based on signal constellation
diagrams and deep learning,” IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks
and Learning Systems, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 718–727, March 2019.
[79] S. K. Jayaweera and M. A. Aref, “Cognitive engine design for spectrum
situational awareness and signals intelligence,” in 2018 21st Interna-
tional Symposium on Wireless Personal Multimedia Communications
(WPMC), Nov 2018, pp. 478–483.
[80] S. M. Hiremath, S. Behura, S. Kedia, S. Deshmukh, and S. K.
Patra, “Deep learning-based modulation classification using time and
Stockwell domain channeling,” in 2019 National Conference on Com-
munications (NCC), Feb 2019, pp. 1–6.
[81] M. Zhang, M. Diao, and L. Guo, “Convolutional neural networks for
automatic cognitive radio waveform recognition,” IEEE Access, vol. 5,
pp. 11 074–11 082, 2017.
[82] A. Vila, D. Branchevsky, K. Logue, S. Olsen, E. Valles, D. Semmen,
A. Utter, and E. Grayver, “Deep and ensemble learning to win the
Army RCO AI signal classification challenge,” 2019.
[83] Namjin Kim, N. Kehtarnavaz, M. B. Yeary, and S. Thornton, “DSP-
based hierarchical neural network modulation signal classification,”
15
IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks, vol. 14, no. 5, pp. 1065–1071,
2003.
[84] M. Kulin, T. Kazaz, I. Moerman, and E. De Poorter, “End-to-end
learning from spectrum data: A deep learning approach for wireless
signal identification in spectrum monitoring applications,” IEEE Ac-
cess, vol. 6, pp. 18 484–18 501, 2018.
[85] Y. Wang, M. Liu, J. Yang, and G. Gui, “Data-driven deep learning for
automatic modulation recognition in cognitive radios,” IEEE Transac-
tions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 68, no. 4, pp. 4074–4077, April
2019.
[86] A. Ali, F. Yangyu, and S. Liu, “Automatic modulation classification
of digital modulation signals with stacked autoencoders,” Digital
Signal Processing, vol. 71, pp. 108 – 116, 2017. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1051200417302087
[87] N. E. West, K. Harwell, and B. McCall, “DFT signal detection and
channelization with a deep neural network modulation classifier,” in
2017 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access
Networks (DySPAN), March 2017, pp. 1–3.
[88] J. J. Popoola and R. van Olst, “The performance evaluation of
a spectrum sensing implementation using an automatic modulation
classification detection method with a Universal Software Radio
Peripheral,” Expert Systems with Applications, vol. 40, no. 6, pp.
2165 – 2173, 2013. [Online]. Available: http://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S0957417412011712
[89] P. D. White, R. M. Buehrer, and W. C. Headley, “FHSS signal
separation using constrained clustering,” in MILCOM 2019 - 2019
IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM), 2019, pp.
159–164.
[90] M. Kozy, J. Yu, R. M. Buehrer, A. Martone, and K. Sherbondy,
“Applying deep Q-Networks to target tracking to improve cognitive
radar,” in Proceedings of 2019 IEEE Radar Conference, 2020, pp. 1–
6.
[91] J. Yu, H. Saad, and R. M. Buehrer, “Indoor localization from channel
state information with recurrent neural networks,” in Proceedings
of 2020 IEEE/ION Position Location and Navigation Symposium
(PLANS), 2020, pp. 1–6.
[92] T. J. O’Shea, L. Pemula, D. Batra, and T. C. Clancy, “Radio transformer
networks: Attention models for learning to synchronize in wireless
systems,” in 2016 50th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and
Computers, Nov 2016, pp. 662–666.
[93] R. Elbakly, H. Aly, and M. Youssef, “TrueStory: Accurate and robust
RF-based floor estimation for challenging indoor environments,” IEEE
Sensors Journal, vol. 18, no. 24, pp. 10 115–10 124, 2018.
[94] M. I. AlHajri, N. T. Ali, and R. M. Shubair, “Indoor localization for
IoT using adaptive feature selection: A cascaded machine learning
approach,” IEEE Antennas and Wireless Propagation Letters, vol. 18,
no. 11, pp. 2306–2310, 2019.
[95] S. S. Chawathe, “Indoor-location classification using RF signatures,”
in 2019 IEEE 18th International Symposium on Network Computing
and Applications (NCA), 2019, pp. 1–4.
[96] J. Torres-Sospedra, R. Montoliu, A. Martı´nez-Uso´, J. P. Avariento, T. J.
Arnau, M. Benedito-Bordonau, and J. Huerta, “UJIIndoorLoc: A new
multi-building and multi-floor database for WLAN fingerprint-based
indoor localization problems,” in 2014 International Conference on
Indoor Positioning and Indoor Navigation (IPIN), 2014, pp. 261–270.
[97] T. J. O’Shea, K. Karra, and T. C. Clancy, “Learning to communicate:
Channel auto-encoders, domain specific regularizers, and attention,”
in 2016 IEEE International Symposium on Signal Processing and
Information Technology (ISSPIT), Dec 2016, pp. 223–228.
[98] K. Merchant, S. Revay, G. Stantchev, and B. Nousain, “Deep learning
for RF device fingerprinting in cognitive communication networks,”
IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Signal Processing, vol. 12, no. 1,
pp. 160–167, Feb 2018.
[99] K. Merchant and B. Nousain, “Enhanced RF fingerprinting for IoT
devices with recurrent neural networks,” in MILCOM 2019 - 2019 IEEE
Military Communications Conference (MILCOM), 2019, pp. 590–597.
[100] ——, “Toward receiver-agnostic RF fingerprint verification,” in 2019
IEEE Globecom Workshops (GC Wkshps), 2019, pp. 1–6.
[101] L. J. Wong, W. C. Headley, S. Andrews, R. M. Gerdes, and A. J.
Michaels, “Clustering learned CNN features from raw I/Q data for
emitter identification,” in MILCOM 2018 - 2018 IEEE Military Com-
munications Conference (MILCOM), Oct 2018, pp. 26–33.
[102] L. J. Wong, W. C. Headley, and A. J. Michaels, “Specific emitter
identification using convolutional neural network-based IQ imbalance
estimators,” IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 33 544–33 555, 2019.
[103] J. M. McGinthy, L. J. Wong, and A. J. Michaels, “Groundwork for
neural network-based specific emitter identification authentication for
IoT,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 6429–6440,
Aug 2019.
[104] N. Tandiya, A. Jauhar, V. Marojevic, and J. H. Reed, “Deep predictive
coding neural network for RF anomaly detection in wireless networks,”
in 2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications Workshops
(ICC Workshops), 2018, pp. 1–6.
[105] T. J. O’Shea, T. C. Clancy, and R. W. McGwier, “Recurrent neural
radio anomaly detection,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1611.00301, 2016.
[106] H. Chang, H. Song, Y. Yi, J. Zhang, H. He, and L. Liu, “Distributive
dynamic spectrum access through deep reinforcement learning: A
reservoir computing-based approach,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal,
vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 1938–1948, 2019.
[107] Y. Xu, J. Yu, W. C. Headley, and R. M. Buehrer, “Deep reinforce-
ment learning for dynamic spectrum access in wireless networks,” in
MILCOM 2018 - 2018 IEEE Military Communications Conference
(MILCOM), Oct 2018, pp. 207–212.
[108] Y. Xu, J. Yu, and R. Buehrer, “The application of deep reinforcement
learning to distributed spectrum access in dynamic heterogeneous
environments with partial observations,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless
Communications, 2020.
[109] B. H. Kirk, M. A. Kozy, K. A. Gallagher, R. M. Narayanan, R. M.
Buehrer, A. F. Martone, and K. D. Sherbondy, “Cognitive software-
defined radar: Evaluation of target detection with RFI avoidance,” in
2019 IEEE Radar Conference (RadarConf), 2019, pp. 1–6.
[110] E. Selvi, R. M. Buehrer, A. Martone, and K. Sherbondy, “Rein-
forcement learning for adaptable bandwidth tracking radars,” IEEE
Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, pp. 1–1, 2020.
[111] C. E. Thornton, R. M. Buehrer, A. F. Martone, and K. D. Sherbondy,
“Experimental analysis of reinforcement learning techniques for spec-
trum sharing radar,” in 2020 IEEE International Radar Conference
(RADAR), 2020, pp. 67–72.
[112] A. F. Martone, K. D. Sherbondy, J. A. Kovarskiy, B. H. Kirk, C. E.
Thornton, J. W. Owen, B. Ravenscroft, A. Egbert, A. Goad, A. Dock-
endorf, R. M. Buehrer, R. M. Narayanan, S. D. Blunt, and C. Baylis,
“Metacognition for radar coexistence,” in 2020 IEEE International
Radar Conference (RADAR), 2020, pp. 55–60.
[113] T. J. O’Shea, T. Roy, N. West, and B. C. Hilburn, “Physical layer com-
munications system design over-the-air using adversarial networks,” in
2018 26th European Signal Processing Conference (EUSIPCO). IEEE,
2018, pp. 529–532.
[114] S. Do¨rner, S. Cammerer, J. Hoydis, and S. t. Brink, “Deep learning
based communication over the air,” IEEE Journal of Selected Topics
in Signal Processing, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 132–143, 2018.
[115] T. Erpek, T. J. O’Shea, and T. C. Clancy, “Learning a physical
layer scheme for the MIMO interference channel,” in 2018 IEEE
International Conference on Communications (ICC). IEEE, 2018,
pp. 1–5.
[116] T. J. O’Shea, T. Erpek, and T. C. Clancy, “Physical layer deep learning
of encodings for the MIMO fading channel,” in 2017 55th Annual Aller-
ton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton),
2017, pp. 76–80.
[117] T. J. O’Shea and T. C. Clancy, “Deep reinforcement learning radio
control and signal detection with KeRLym, a gym RL agent,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1605.09221, 2016.
[118] K. M. Thilina, K. W. Choi, N. Saquib, and E. Hossain, “Machine
learning techniques for cooperative spectrum sensing in cognitive
radio networks,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,
vol. 31, no. 11, pp. 2209–2221, November 2013.
[119] P. Wang and M. Vindiola, “Data augmentation for blind signal clas-
sification,” in MILCOM 2019 - 2019 IEEE Military Communications
Conference (MILCOM), 2019, pp. 149–154.
[120] Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020.
[121] O. A. Dobre, A. Abdi, Y. Bar-Ness, and W. Su, “Survey of automatic
modulation classification techniques: classical approaches and new
trends,” IET Communications, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 137–156, 2007.
[122] “SignalEye AI software for automated signal classification -
General Dynamics.” [Online]. Available: https://gdmissionsystems.
com/products/electronic-warfare/signaleye
[123] T. J. O’Shea, N. West, M. Vondal, and T. C. Clancy, “Semi-supervised
radio signal identification,” in 2017 19th International Conference on
Advanced Communication Technology (ICACT), Feb 2017, pp. 33–38.
[124] A. C. Polak, S. Dolatshahi, and D. L. Goeckel, “Identifying wireless
users via transmitter imperfections,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas
in Communications, vol. 29, no. 7, pp. 1469–1479, August 2011.
[125] K. Chowdhury, S. Ioannidis, and T. Melodia, “Deep learning for RF sig-
nal classification and fingerprinting,” IEEE Military Communications
Conference (MILCOM), 2019.
16
[126] A. Bacak and H. C¸elebi, “Practical considerations for RSS RF fin-
gerprinting based indoor localization systems,” in 2014 22nd Signal
Processing and Communications Applications Conference (SIU), April
2014, pp. 497–500.
[127] B. Clark, “Efficient waveform spectrum aggregation for algorithm
verification and validation,” Sep 2016. [Online]. Available: https:
//gnuradio.org/grcon-2016/talks/
[128] J. D. Gaeddert. [Online]. Available: https://liquidsdr.org/
[129] “Matlab,” the MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA.
[130] Shan Kang, Naiwen Chen, Mi Yan, and Xiaoxiao Chen, “Detecting
identity-spoof attack based on BP network in cognitive radio network,”
in Proceedings of 2011 Cross Strait Quad-Regional Radio Science and
Wireless Technology Conference, vol. 2, July 2011, pp. 1603–1606.
[131] T. J. O’Shea, S. Hitefield, and J. Corgan, “End-to-end radio traffic
sequence recognition with recurrent neural networks,” in 2016 IEEE
Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing (GlobalSIP),
Dec 2016, pp. 277–281.
[132] N. Tandiya, A. Jauhar, V. Marojevic, and J. H. Reed, “Deep predictive
coding neural network for RF anomaly detection in wireless networks,”
in 2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications Workshops
(ICC Workshops), May 2018, pp. 1–6.
[133] M. Sadeghi and E. G. Larsson, “Adversarial attacks on deep-learning
based radio signal classification,” IEEE Wireless Commun. Letters,
2018.
[134] S. Zheng, P. Qi, S. Chen, and X. Yang, “Fusion methods for CNN-
based automatic modulation classification,” IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp.
66 496–66 504, 2019.
[135] S. A. Shapero, A. B. Dill, and B. O. Odelowo, “Identifying agile wave-
forms with neural networks,” in 2018 21st International Conference on
Information Fusion (FUSION), July 2018, pp. 745–752.
[136] G. Ros, L. Sellart, J. Materzynska, D. Vazquez, and A. M. Lopez, “The
SYNTHIA dataset: A large collection of synthetic images for semantic
segmentation of urban scenes,” in 2016 IEEE Conference on Computer
Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), June 2016, pp. 3234–3243.
[137] E. Testi, E. Favarelli, and A. Giorgetti, “Machine learning for user
traffic classification in wireless systems,” in 2018 26th European Signal
Processing Conference (EUSIPCO), Sep. 2018, pp. 2040–2044.
[138] K. Sankhe, M. Belgiovine, F. Zhou, S. Riyaz, S. Ioannidis, and
K. Chowdhury, “ORACLE: Optimized radio classification through
convolutional neural networks,” in IEEE INFOCOM 2019-IEEE Con-
ference on Computer Communications. IEEE, 2019, pp. 370–378.
[139] D. Adesina, J. Bassey, and L. Qian, “Practical radio frequency learning
for future wireless communication systems,” in MILCOM 2019 - 2019
IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM), Nov 2019, pp.
311–317.
[140] N. Wagle and E. W. Frew, “Transfer learning for dynamic RF environ-
ments,” in 2012 American Control Conference (ACC), June 2012, pp.
1406–1411.
[141] ——, “Online evaluation of communication models derived via transfer
learning,” in 2012 IEEE Globecom Workshops, Dec 2012, pp. 1609–
1613.
[142] B. Hilburn, N. West, T. O’Shea, and T. Roy, “SigMF: the signal
metadata format,” in Proceedings of the GNU Radio Conference, vol. 3,
no. 1, 2018.
[143] J. Deng, W. Dong, R. Socher, L. Li, Kai Li, and Li Fei-Fei, “ImageNet:
A large-scale hierarchical image database,” in 2009 IEEE Conference
on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2009, pp. 248–255.
[144] J. Torres-Sospedra, R. Montoliu, A. Martı´nez-Uso´, J. P. Avariento,
T. J. Arnau, M. Benedito-Bordonau, and J. Huerta. UJIIndoorLoc
database. (2020, May 24). [Online]. Available: http://geotec.uji.es/
2014/10/03/ujiindoorloc-database/
[145] DEEPSIG. RF datasets for machine learning. (2020, May 21).
[Online]. Available: https://www.deepsig.io/datasets
[146] K. Sankhe, M. Belgiovine, F. Zhou, S. Riyaz, S. Ioannidis,
and K. Chowdhury. Datasets for RF fingerprinting of bit-similar
USRP X310 radios. (2020, May 21). [Online]. Available: http:
//www.genesys-lab.org/oracle
[147] N. Akhtar and A. Mian, “Threat of adversarial attacks on deep learning
in computer vision: A survey,” IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 14 410–14 430,
2018.
[148] Y. Qin, N. Carlini, I. Goodfellow, G. Cottrell, and C. Raffel, “Imper-
ceptible, robust, and targeted adversarial examples for automatic speech
recognition,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1903.10346, 2019.
[149] N. Carlini and D. Wagner, “Audio adversarial examples: Targeted at-
tacks on speech-to-text,” in 2018 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops
(SPW), May 2018, pp. 1–7.
[150] R. Taori, A. Kamsetty, B. Chu, and N. Vemuri, “Targeted adversarial
examples for black box audio systems,” in 2019 IEEE Security and
Privacy Workshops (SPW), May 2019, pp. 15–20.
[151] W. E. Zhang, Q. Z. Sheng, A. Alhazmi, and C. Li, “Adversarial
attacks on deep-learning models in natural language processing: A
survey,” ACM Trans. Intell. Syst. Technol., vol. 11, no. 3, Apr 2020.
[Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1145/3374217
[152] K. Davaslioglu and Y. E. Sagduyu, “Trojan attacks on wireless signal
classification with adversarial machine learning,” in 2019 IEEE In-
ternational Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DyS-
PAN), Nov 2019, pp. 1–6.
[153] S. Bair, M. Delvecchio, B. Flowers, A. J. Michaels, and W. C. Headley,
“On the limitations of targeted adversarial evasion attacks against
deep learning enabled modulation recognition,” in ACM Workshop on
Wireless Security and Machine Learning (WiseML 2019), May 2019.
[154] S. Kokalj-Filipovic, R. Miller, and J. Morman, “Targeted adversarial
examples against rf deep classifiers,” in Proceedings of the
ACM Workshop on Wireless Security and Machine Learning,
ser. WiseML 2019. New York, NY, USA: Association for
Computing Machinery, 2019, p. 6–11. [Online]. Available: https:
//doi.org/10.1145/3324921.3328792
[155] B. Flowers, R. M. Buehrer, and W. C. Headley, “Communications
aware adversarial residual networks for over the air evasion attacks,”
in MILCOM 2019 - 2019 IEEE Military Communications Conference
(MILCOM), Nov 2019, pp. 133–140.
[156] ——, “Evaluating adversarial evasion attacks in the context of wireless
communications,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and
Security, vol. 15, pp. 1102–1113, 2020.
[157] M. Z. Hameed, A. Gyorgy, and D. Gunduz, “Communication without
interception: Defense against deep-learning-based modulation detec-
tion,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.10674, 2019.
[158] M. Sadeghi and E. G. Larsson, “Physical adversarial attacks
against end-to-end autoencoder communication systems,” CoRR, vol.
abs/1902.08391, 2019. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1902.
08391
[159] M. Usama, M. Asim, J. Qadir, A. Al-Fuqaha, and M. A. Imran,
“Adversarial machine learning attack on modulation classification,” in
2019 UK/ China Emerging Technologies (UCET), Aug 2019, pp. 1–4.
[160] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, S. Jha, M. Fredrikson, Z. B. Celik, and
A. Swami, “The limitations of deep learning in adversarial settings,”
in IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P).
IEEE, 2016, Conference Proceedings, pp. 372–387.
[161] A. Chakraborty, M. Alam, V. Dey, A. Chattopadhyay, and
D. Mukhopadhyay, “Adversarial attacks and defences: A survey,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1810.00069, 2018.
[162] L. Huang, A. D. Joseph, B. Nelson, B. I. Rubinstein, and J. D.
Tygar, “Adversarial machine learning,” in Proc. of the 4th ACM
Workshop on Security and Artificial Intelligence, ser. AISec ’11.
New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2011, pp. 43–58. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2046684.2046692
[163] M. Barreno, B. Nelson, R. Sears, A. D. Joseph, and J. D. Tygar, “Can
machine learning be secure?” in Proc. of the 2006 ACM Symposium
on Information, computer and communications security. ACM, 2006,
Conference Proceedings, pp. 16–25.
[164] M. Barreno, B. Nelson, A. D. Joseph, and J. Tygar, “The security of
machine learning,” Machine Learning, vol. 81, no. 2, pp. 121–148,
2010.
[165] B. Biggio and F. Roli, “Wild patterns: Ten years after the rise
of adversarial machine learning,” Pattern Recognition, vol. 84, pp.
317–331, 2018. [Online]. Available: http://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S0031320318302565
[166] F. Trame`r, F. Zhang, A. Juels, M. K. Reiter, and T. Ristenpart,
“Stealing machine learning models via prediction apis,” in Proceedings
of the 25th USENIX Conference on Security Symposium, ser.
SEC’16. Berkeley, CA, USA: USENIX Association, 2016, pp. 601–
618. [Online]. Available: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3241094.
3241142
[167] R. Shokri, M. Stronati, C. Song, and V. Shmatikov, “Membership
inference attacks against machine learning models,” in 2017 IEEE Sym-
posium on Security and Privacy (SP), 2017, Conference Proceedings,
pp. 3–18.
[168] I. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy, “Explaining and harnessing
adversarial examples,” in Int. Conf. on Learning Representations,
2015. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6572
[169] N. Carlini and D. Wagner, “Towards evaluating the robustness of neural
networks,” in 2017 ieee symposium on security and privacy (sp). IEEE,
2017, pp. 39–57.
17
[170] Y. Dong, F. Liao, T. Pang, H. Su, J. Zhu, X. Hu, and J. Li, “Boosting
adversarial attacks with momentum,” in Proc. of the IEEE Conf. on
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2018.
[171] A. Nguyen, J. Yosinski, and J. Clune, “Deep neural networks are
easily fooled: High confidence predictions for unrecognizable images,”
in Proc. IEEE Conf. on Comp. Vision and Pattern Recog., 2015,
Conference Proceedings, pp. 427–436.
[172] Y. Shi, K. Davaslioglu, and Y. E. Sagduyu, “Generative adversarial
network for wireless signal spoofing,” in Proceedings of the
ACM Workshop on Wireless Security and Machine Learning,
ser. WiseML 2019. New York, NY, USA: Association for
Computing Machinery, 2019, p. 55–60. [Online]. Available: https:
//doi.org/10.1145/3324921.3329695
[173] Z. Akhtar and D. Dasgupta, “A brief survey of adversarial machine
learning and defense strategies,” 2019.
[174] S. Kokalj-Filipovic, R. Miller, and G. Vanhoy, “Adversarial examples
in RF deep learning: Detection and physical robustness,” in 2019 IEEE
Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing (GlobalSIP),
Nov 2019, pp. 1–5.
[175] N. Carlini and D. Wagner, “Adversarial examples are not easily
detected: Bypassing ten detection methods,” in Proceedings of the 10th
ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security, ser. AISec ’17.
New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2017, p.
3–14. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1145/3128572.3140444
[176] A. Kurakin, I. J. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio, “Adversarial machine
learning at scale,” CoRR, vol. abs/1611.01236, 2016. [Online].
Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1611.01236
[177] A. Madry, A. Makelov, L. Schmidt, D. Tsipras, and A. Vladu, “Towards
deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1706.06083, 2017.
[178] A. Shafahi, M. Najibi, A. Ghiasi, Z. Xu, J. P. Dickerson, C. Studer,
L. S. Davis, G. Taylor, and T. Goldstein, “Adversarial training
for free!” CoRR, vol. abs/1904.12843, 2019. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1904.12843
[179] F. Trame`r, A. Kurakin, N. Papernot, D. Boneh, and P. D. McDaniel,
“Ensemble adversarial training: Attacks and defenses,” CoRR, vol.
abs/1705.07204, 2017.
[180] S. Kokalj-Filipovic, R. Miller, N. Chang, and C. L. Lau, “Mitigation
of adversarial examples in rf deep classifiers utilizing autoencoder pre-
training,” in 2019 International Conference on Military Communica-
tions and Information Systems (ICMCIS). IEEE, 2019, pp. 1–6.
[181] N. Carlini, A. Athalye, N. Papernot, W. Brendel, J. Rauber, D. Tsipras,
I. Goodfellow, A. Madry, and A. Kurakin, “On evaluating adversarial
robustness,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.06705, 2019.
[182] N. Papernot, N. Carlini, I. Goodfellow, R. Feinman, F. Faghri,
A. Matyasko, K. Hambardzumyan, Y.-L. Juang, A. Kurakin, and
R. Sheatsley, “cleverhans v2. 0.0: an adversarial machine learning
library,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.00768, 2016.
[183] T.-W. Weng, H. Zhang, P.-Y. Chen, J. Yi, D. Su, Y. Gao, C.-J. Hsieh,
and L. Daniel, “Evaluating the robustness of neural networks: An
extreme value theory approach,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.10578,
2018.
[184] A. Kurakin, I. J. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio, “Adversarial examples
in the physical world,” CoRR, vol. abs/1607.02533, 2016. [Online].
Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1607.02533
[185] B. Kim, Y. E. Sagduyu, K. Davaslioglu, T. Erpek, and S. Ulukus,
“Over-the-air adversarial attacks on deep learning based modulation
classifier over wireless channels,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.02400,
2020.
[186] ——, “Channel-aware adversarial attacks against deep learning-based
wireless signal classifiers,” 2020.
[187] M. DelVecchio, B. Flowers, and W. C. Headley, “Effects of forward
error correction on communications aware evasion attacks,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:2005.13123, 2020.
[188] F. Restuccia, S. D’Oro, A. Al-Shawabka, B. C. Rendon, K. Chowdhury,
S. Ioannidis, and T. Melodia, “Hacking the waveform: Generalized
wireless adversarial deep learning,” 2020.
[189] T. Erpek, Y. E. Sagduyu, and Y. Shi, “Deep learning for launching and
mitigating wireless jamming attacks,” IEEE Transactions on Cognitive
Communications and Networking, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 2–14, March 2019.
[190] Y. Shi, T. Erpek, Y. E. Sagduyu, and J. H. Li, “Spectrum data poisoning
with adversarial deep learning.” in IEEE Military Commun. Conf.
(MILCOM), 2018, Conference Proceedings.
[191] E. B. Kania, “”AI weapons” in china’s military innovation,” Brookings
Institute, p. 1–23, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.brookings.
edu/research/ai-weapons-in-chinas-military-innovation/
[192] S. Neema, “Assured autonomy.” [Online]. Available: https://www.
darpa.mil/program/assured-autonomy
[193] M. Turek, “Explainable artificial intelligence (XAI).” [Online]. Avail-
able: https://www.darpa.mil/program/explainable-artificial-intelligence
[194] D. V. Carvalho, E. M. Pereira, and J. S. Cardoso, “Machine learning
interpretability: A survey on methods and metrics,” Electronics, vol. 8,
no. 8, p. 832, 2019.
[195] G. Katz, C. Barrett, D. L. Dill, K. Julian, and M. J. Kochenderfer, “Re-
luplex: An efficient SMT solver for verifying deep neural networks,” in
International Conference on Computer Aided Verification. Springer,
2017, pp. 97–117.
[196] R. R. Bunel, I. Turkaslan, P. Torr, P. Kohli, and P. K. Mudigonda,
“A unified view of piecewise linear neural network verification,” in
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 2018, pp. 4790–
4799.
[197] K. Dvijotham, R. Stanforth, S. Gowal, T. A. Mann, and P. Kohli, “A
dual approach to scalable verification of deep networks.” in UAI, vol. 1,
2018, p. 2.
[198] W. Ruan, M. Wu, Y. Sun, X. Huang, D. Kroening, and
M. Kwiatkowska, “Global robustness evaluation of deep neural net-
works with provable guarantees for the Hamming distance.” Interna-
tional Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019.
[199] M. Wu, M. Wicker, W. Ruan, X. Huang, and M. Kwiatkowska, “A
game-based approximate verification of deep neural networks with
provable guarantees,” Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 807, pp. 298–
329, 2020.
[200] T. Gehr, M. Mirman, D. Drachsler-Cohen, P. Tsankov, S. Chaudhuri,
and M. Vechev, “AI2: Safety and robustness certification of neural
networks with abstract interpretation,” in 2018 IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy (SP), May 2018, pp. 3–18.
[201] M. Kuhn and K. Johnson, Applied predictive modeling. Springer,
2013, vol. 26.
[202] Y. Sun, X. Huang, D. Kroening, J. Sharp, M. Hill, and R. Ashmore,
“Testing deep neural networks,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1803.04792,
2018.
[203] Y. Sun, M. Wu, W. Ruan, X. Huang, M. Kwiatkowska, and D. Kroen-
ing, “Concolic testing for deep neural networks,” in Proceedings of
the 33rd ACM/IEEE International Conference on Automated Software
Engineering, 2018, pp. 109–119.
[204] L. Ma, F. Juefei-Xu, F. Zhang, J. Sun, M. Xue, B. Li, C. Chen, T. Su,
L. Li, Y. Liu et al., “DeepGauge: Multi-granularity testing criteria
for deep learning systems,” in Proceedings of the 33rd ACM/IEEE
International Conference on Automated Software Engineering, 2018,
pp. 120–131.
[205] S. Ma, Y. Liu, W.-C. Lee, X. Zhang, and A. Grama, “MODE: auto-
mated neural network model debugging via state differential analysis
and input selection,” in Proceedings of the 2018 26th ACM Joint Meet-
ing on European Software Engineering Conference and Symposium on
the Foundations of Software Engineering, 2018, pp. 175–186.
[206] N. Carlini and D. Wagner, “Towards evaluating the robustness of neural
networks,” in 2017 ieee symposium on security and privacy (sp). IEEE,
2017, pp. 39–57.
[207] K. Pei, Y. Cao, J. Yang, and S. Jana, “DeepXplore: Automated
whitebox testing of deep learning systems,” in Proceedings of the 26th
Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, 2017, pp. 1–18.
[208] L. Ma, F. Zhang, J. Sun, M. Xue, B. Li, F. Juefei-Xu, C. Xie, L. Li,
Y. Liu, J. Zhao et al., “DeepMutation: Mutation testing of deep learning
systems,” in 2018 IEEE 29th International Symposium on Software
Reliability Engineering (ISSRE). IEEE, 2018, pp. 100–111.
[209] I. Goodfellow and N. Papernot, “The challenge of verification and
testing of machine learning,” Jun 2017. [Online]. Available: http:
//www.cleverhans.io/security/privacy/ml/2017/06/14/verification.html
[210] S. Mohseni, N. Zarei, and E. D. Ragan, “A survey of evaluation
methods and measures for interpretable machine learning,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1811.11839, 2018.
[211] M. Du, N. Liu, and X. Hu, “Techniques for interpretable machine
learning,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 63, no. 1, pp. 68–77,
2019.
[212] W. H. Clark, V. Arndorfer, B. Tamir, D. Kim, C. Vives, H. Morris, L. J.
Wong, and W. C. Headley, “Developing RFML intuition: an automatic
modulation classification architecture case study,” in MILCOM 2019
- 2019 IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM), Oct
2019.
[213] O. Bastani, C. Kim, and H. Bastani, “Interpretability via model
extraction,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.09773, 2017.
18
[214] D. Bahdanau, K. Cho, and Y. Bengio, “Neural machine translation by
jointly learning to align and translate,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1409.0473,
2014.
[215] C. Molnar, Interpretable machine learning. Lulu. com, 2019.
[216] S. Bach, A. Binder, G. Montavon, F. Klauschen, K.-R. Mu¨ller, and
W. Samek, “On pixel-wise explanations for non-linear classifier deci-
sions by layer-wise relevance propagation,” PloS one, vol. 10, no. 7,
2015.
[217] K. Simonyan, A. Vedaldi, and A. Zisserman, “Deep inside convolu-
tional networks: Visualising image classification models and saliency
maps,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6034, 2013.
[218] J. T. Springenberg, A. Dosovitskiy, T. Brox, and M. Riedmiller,
“Striving for simplicity: The all convolutional net,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1412.6806, 2014.
[219] R. R. Selvaraju, M. Cogswell, A. Das, R. Vedantam, D. Parikh, and
D. Batra, “Grad-CAM: Visual explanations from deep networks via
gradient-based localization,” in Proceedings of the IEEE international
conference on computer vision, 2017, pp. 618–626.
[220] M. D. Zeiler and R. Fergus, “Visualizing and understanding con-
volutional networks,” in European conference on computer vision.
Springer, 2014, pp. 818–833.
[221] Y. Gal, “Uncertainty in deep learning,” University of Cambridge, vol. 1,
p. 3, 2016.
[222] S. Jha, S. Raj, S. Fernandes, S. K. Jha, S. Jha, B. Jalaian, G. Verma,
and A. Swami, “Attribution-based confidence metric for deep neural
networks,” in Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems
32, H. Wallach, H. Larochelle, A. Beygelzimer, F. d'Alche´-Buc,
E. Fox, and R. Garnett, Eds. Curran Associates, Inc., 2019,
pp. 11 826–11 837. [Online]. Available: http://papers.nips.cc/paper/
9355-attribution-based-confidence-metric-for-deep-neural-networks.
pdf
[223] J. Yosinski, J. Clune, A. Nguyen, T. Fuchs, and H. Lipson, “Under-
standing neural networks through deep visualization,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1506.06579, 2015.
[224] G. Hooker, “Discovering additive structure in black box functions,” in
Proceedings of the tenth ACM SIGKDD international conference on
Knowledge discovery and data mining, 2004, pp. 575–580.
[225] J. Krause, A. Perer, and K. Ng, “Interacting with predictions: Visual
inspection of black-box machine learning models,” in Proceedings of
the 2016 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems,
2016, pp. 5686–5697.
[226] A. Zien, N. Kra¨mer, S. Sonnenburg, and G. Ra¨tsch, “The feature im-
portance ranking measure,” in Joint European Conference on Machine
Learning and Knowledge Discovery in Databases. Springer, 2009,
pp. 694–709.
[227] M. M.-C. Vidovic, N. Go¨rnitz, K.-R. Mu¨ller, and M. Kloft, “Feature
importance measure for non-linear learning algorithms,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1611.07567, 2016.
[228] A. Saltelli, “Sensitivity analysis for importance assessment,” Risk
analysis, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 579–590, 2002.
[229] J. D. Olden and D. A. Jackson, “Illuminating the “black box”: a
randomization approach for understanding variable contributions in
artificial neural networks,” Ecological modelling, vol. 154, no. 1-2,
pp. 135–150, 2002.
[230] R. Shwartz-Ziv and N. Tishby, “Opening the black box of deep neural
networks via information,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.00810, 2017.
[231] Z. C. Lipton, “The mythos of model interpretability,” Queue, vol. 16,
no. 3, pp. 31–57, 2018.
[232] X. Huang, D. Kroening, W. Ruan, J. Sharp, Y. Sun, E. Thamo, M. Wu,
and X. Yi, “A survey of safety and trustworthiness of deep neural
networks,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1812.08342, 2018.
[233] D. Roy, T. Mukherjee, and M. Chatterjee, “Machine learning in ad-
versarial RF environments,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 57,
no. 5, pp. 82–87, May 2019.
[234] N. Instruments, “Enabling AI research for 5G net-
works with NI SDR,” Whitepaper, 2019. [On-
line]. Available: https://www.ni.com/en-us/innovations/white-papers/
19/enabling-ai-research-for-5g-with-sdr-platform.html
[235] E. Balevi and R. D. Gitlin, “Unsupervised machine learning in 5G
networks for low latency communications,” in 2017 IEEE 36th In-
ternational Performance Computing and Communications Conference
(IPCCC), Dec 2017, pp. 1–2.
[236] T. Ma, F. Hu, and M. Ma, “Fast and efficient physical layer au-
thentication for 5G HetNet handover,” in 2017 27th International
Telecommunication Networks and Applications Conference (ITNAC),
Nov 2017, pp. 1–3.
[237] V. P. Kafle, Y. Fukushima, P. Martinez-Julia, and T. Miyazawa, “Con-
sideration on automation of 5G network slicing with machine learning,”
in 2018 ITU Kaleidoscope: Machine Learning for a 5G Future (ITU
K), Nov 2018, pp. 1–8.
[238] M. I. AlHajri, N. T. Ali, and R. M. Shubair, “Classification of indoor
environments for IoT applications: A machine learning approach,”
IEEE Antennas and Wireless Propagation Letters, vol. 17, no. 12, pp.
2164–2168, Dec 2018.
[239] B. Chatterjee, D. Das, S. Maity, and S. Sen, “RF-PUF: Enhancing IoT
security through authentication of wireless nodes using in-situ machine
learning,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 388–398,
Feb 2019.
[240] A. Guerra-Manzanares, H. Bahsi, and S. No˜mm, “Hybrid feature
selection models for machine learning based botnet detection in IoT
networks,” in 2019 International Conference on Cyberworlds (CW),
Oct 2019, pp. 324–327.
[241] Y. Liu, Y. J. Morton, and Y. Jiao, “Application of machine learning to
the characterization of GPS L1 ionospheric amplitude scintillation,”
in 2018 IEEE/ION Position, Location and Navigation Symposium
(PLANS), April 2018, pp. 1159–1166.
[242] G. Liu, R. Zhang, C. Wang, and L. Liu, “Synchronization-free GPS
spoofing detection with crowdsourced air traffic control data,” in 2019
20th IEEE International Conference on Mobile Data Management
(MDM), June 2019, pp. 260–268.
[243] D. I. Moody, D. A. Smith, T. E. Light, M. J. Heavner, T. D. Hamlin, and
D. M. Suszcynsky, “Signal classification of satellite-based recordings
of radiofrequency (RF) transients using data-adaptive dictionaries,” in
2013 Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, Nov
2013, pp. 1291–1295.
[244] NVidia, “DGX-2 datasheet,” 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://www.nvidia.com/content/dam/en-zz/Solutions/Data-Center/
dgx-2/dgx-2-print-datasheet-738070-nvidia-a4-web-uk.pdf
[245] F. Altiparmak, F. C. Akyon, E. Ozmen, F. Cogun, and A. Bayri,
“Towards cognitive sensing: Radar function classification using mul-
titask learning,” in 2019 27th Signal Processing and Communications
Applications Conference (SIU), April 2019, pp. 1–4.
[246] R. M. Bowen, F. Sahin, A. Radomski, and D. Sarosky, “Embedded
one-class classification on RF generator using mixture of Gaussians,” in
2014 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics
(SMC), Oct 2014, pp. 2657–2662.
[247] V. Camus, L. Mei, C. Enz, and M. Verhelst, “Review and benchmarking
of precision-scalable multiply-accumulate unit architectures for em-
bedded neural-network processing,” IEEE Journal on Emerging and
Selected Topics in Circuits and Systems, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 697–711,
Dec 2019.
[248] S. Fox, J. Faraone, D. Boland, K. Vissers, and P. H. W. Leong, “Train-
ing deep neural networks in low-precision with high accuracy using
FPGAs,” in 2019 International Conference on Field-Programmable
Technology (ICFPT), Dec 2019, pp. 1–9.
[249] I. Colbert, K. Kreutz-Delgado, and S. Das, “AX-DBN: An approximate
computing framework for the design of low-power discriminative deep
belief networks,” in 2019 International Joint Conference on Neural
Networks (IJCNN), July 2019, pp. 1–9.
[250] Y. Gwon, S. Dastangoo, C. Fossa, and H. T. Kung, “Fast online
learning of antijamming and jamming strategies,” in 2015 IEEE Global
Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), Dec 2015, pp. 1–6.
[251] L. H. Nguyen and T. D. Tran, “Separation of radio-frequency interfer-
ence from SAR signals via dictionary learning,” in 2018 IEEE Radar
Conference (RadarConf18), April 2018, pp. 0908–0913.
[252] M. A. Hannan, M. M. Hoque, A. Hussain, Y. Yusof, and P. J.
Ker, “State-of-the-art and energy management system of lithium-ion
batteries in electric vehicle applications: Issues and recommendations,”
IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 19 362–19 378, 2018.
[253] K. Vinsen, S. Foster, and R. Dodson, “Using machine learning for the
detection of radio frequency interference,” in 2019 URSI Asia-Pacific
Radio Science Conference (AP-RASC), March 2019, pp. 1–4.
[254] A. P. Arechiga and A. J. Michaels, “The effect of weight errors on
neural networks,” in 2018 IEEE 8th Annual Computing and Commu-
nication Workshop and Conference (CCWC), Jan 2018, pp. 190–196.
[255] ——, “The robustness of modern deep learning architectures against
single event upset errors,” in 2018 IEEE High Performance extreme
Computing Conference (HPEC), Sep. 2018, pp. 1–6.
[256] G. Li, S. K. S. Hari, M. Sullivan, T. Tsai, K. Pattabiraman, J. Emer,
and S. W. Keckler, “Understanding error propagation in deep learning
neural network (DNN) accelerators and applications,” in Proceedings
of the International Conference for High Performance Computing,
Networking, Storage and Analysis, ser. SC ’17. New York, NY, USA:
19
Association for Computing Machinery, 2017. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1145/3126908.3126964
[257] E. Altland, J. Castellanos, J. Detwiler, P. Fermin, R. Ferra´, C. Kelly,
C. Latoski, T. Ma, T. Maher, J. M. Kuzin, A. Mohammadian, A. S.
Abdalla, W. C. Headley, and A. J. Michaels, “Quantifying degradations
of convolutional neural networks in space environments,” in 2019
IEEE Cognitive Communications for Aerospace Applications Workshop
(CCAAW), June 2019, pp. 1–7.
[258] B. Reagen, U. Gupta, L. Pentecost, P. Whatmough, S. K. Lee, N. Mul-
holland, D. Brooks, and G. Wei, “Ares: A framework for quantifying
the resilience of deep neural networks,” in 2018 55th ACM/ESDA/IEEE
Design Automation Conference (DAC), June 2018, pp. 1–6.
[259] Z. Yan, Y. Shi, W. Li-ao, M. Hashimoto, X. Zhou, and C. Zhuo,
“When single event upset meets deep neural networks: Observations,
explorations, and remedies,” ArXiv, vol. abs/1909.04697, 2019.
[260] M. A. Neggaz, I. Alouani, P. R. Lorenzo, and S. Niar, “A reliability
study on CNNs for critical embedded systems,” in 2018 IEEE 36th
International Conference on Computer Design (ICCD), Oct 2018, pp.
476–479.
[261] E. Ozen and A. Orailoglu, “Sanity-Check: Boosting the reliability of
safety-critical deep neural network applications,” in 2019 IEEE 28th
Asian Test Symposium (ATS), Dec 2019, pp. 7–75.
